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C.: The Witch's Brew: Nigerian Schemes, Counterfeit Cashier's Checks,
TIE WITCH'S BREw:

NIGERIAN SCHEMES, COUNTERFEIT CASHIER'S

CHECKS, AND YOUR TRUST ACCOUNT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, check fraud schemes have grown significantly, with
incidents of counterfeit cashier's checks more than tripling between 2004 and
2006.1 Fueling this explosive growth, new technologies have enabled more
sophisticated counterfeits, and modem commerce has connected unsuspecting
consumers to fraudsters. 2 Typically, these schemes involve the fraudster
presenting a too-good-to-be-true offer to the consumer. The fraudster asks the
victim to deposit a counterfeit official check into the victim's account and then
transfer a portion of the check's proceeds back to the fraudster.3 Attempting to
curb the effectiveness of these schemes, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency4(OCC) warned all national banks of typical counterfeit cashier's check
schemes. In particular, the OCC warned of a scheme that could victimize an
unwary attorney:

1. 4 FDIC OMBUDSMAN REP. TO THE INDUSTRY No. 2 (2007), available at http://www.fdic.
gov/regulations/resources/ombudsman/feedback/message0807.html [hereinafter FDIC REPORT]; 5
Things You Can Do to Avoid Costly Scams Involving Fake Checks and Money Orders, FDIC
CONSUMER NEWS, Winter 2006/2007, at 6, 6, available at http://www.fdic.gov/CONSUMERS/
consumer/news/cnwinO607/scams.html [hereinafter FDIC CONSUMER NEWS].
2.
See FDIC CONSUMER NEWS, supra note 1, at 6.
3.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. No. 2007-2,
FRAUDULENT CASHIER'S CHECKS: GUIDANCE TO NATIONAL BANKS CONCERNING SCHEMES
INVOLVING FRAUDULENT CASHIER'S CHECKS (2007), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
bulletin/2007-2.html [hereinafter OCC BULL. No. 2007-2]. Negotiable instrument law, especially
with regard to checks, has a unique terminology. "Official checks" normally refer to teller's checks
or cashier's checks. Although similar, a cashier's check and a teller's check are not the same. A
"cashier's check" is a draft where the same bank is both the drawer and the drawee, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-104(g) (Supp. 2009), and a "teller's check" is a draft issued by a bank that is drawn on
the issuing bank's account at another bank, id. § 36-3-104(h). The "drawer" of a check is the party
ordering another to make payment. Id. § 36-3-103(a)(5). The "drawee" is the party ordered to make
payment. Id. § 36-3-103(a)(4). In addition, if the drawee is a bank, then that bank is known as the
"payor bank." Id. § 36-4-105(3). The "payee" of an instrument is the party the instrument identifies
as authorized to receive payment. See id. § 36-3-109 official cmt. 2. The first bank to take the
instrument from the payee (or other holder) of the instrument is the "depositary bank." Id § 36-4105(2). In addition, a "collecting bank" is "a bank handling an item for collection except the payor
bank." Id. § 36-4-105(5). As with the instruments and their parties, this area of law has specifically
defined certain activities as well. A "forged check" refers to a check bearing an unauthorized
drawer's signature, see id. § 36-3-403 official cmt. 1; an "altered check" includes a check whose
amount has been changed, see id. § 36-3-407(a); and a "counterfeit check" is a check that has been
manufactured to resemble a valid check, see George Brandon & Matthew J. Ohre, The Nigerian
Check Scam: An Oldie Revisited, 126 BANKING L.J. 223, 224 (2009). Different loss allocation rules
govern cases involving checks bearing a forged drawer's signature and checks bearing a forged
indorsement. Compare § 36-3-406 (responsibility for forged signature), with § 36-3-405
(responsibility for forged indorsement). This Note will focus on counterfeit check schemes
involving cashier's checks as opposed to teller's checks.
4.
OCC BULL. No. 2007-2, supra note 3.
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Money Transfer Agent. The consumer is solicited to act as a money
transfer agent. The consumer is told that he or she will receive cashier's
checks to deposit into his or her bank account. The consumer is then
told to wire specific sums to various persons or accounts in other
countries.
For the schemes that do come to fruition, the OCC asserts
that the bank customer
"will likely be the one who suffers the financial loss."'6
Although courts and commentators have sometimes described the victims of
these schemes as "desperate, greedy, naYve, gullible, and even dumb,",7 a plethora
of people, including electricians, 8 engineers, and attorneys, 10 have fallen prey to
counterfeiters' and forgers' efforts. Most people's common sense prevents them
from entering into these schemes, but for some their better judgment falls to the
11
wayside "once [they] sp[y] the . . . pot of gold at the end of the rainbow."
Consequently, "[w]hen you fold into one pot a hint of gullibility, a pinch of
need, a dose of a practiced get-rich sales pitch, and the flavor of the safety and
security that comes with a cashier's check, you have a witch's brew of
trouble." 12 Moreover, this witch's brew becomes even more dangerous when
a
13
bank employee, without qualification, indicates "that the check is 'good."'
In some check fraud cases, customers receiving checks have asked their
depositary bank whether the check is "good., 14 To the customer, this question

5.

Id.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC CA 2007-1, AVOIDING
CASHIER'S CHECK FRAUD (2007), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/ADVISORY/20071.html [hereinafter OCC CA 2007-1]; see also FDIC CONSUMER NEWS, supra note 1 ("In these
cases, the depositor most likely will be held responsiblefor the entire amount of the fraudulent
check."); William 0. Higgins, Are You Sure You're Ready to Disburse?, S.C. LAW., Nov. 2009, at
37, 39 (advising lawyers of the risk of refund and charge back in the case of such schemes);
ALERT: Law Firm Scams, E-BLAST (S.C. Bar Ass'n, Columbia, S.C.), June 23, 2009,
http://www.scbar.org/member resources/publications/e-blast (follow "E-Blast Archives" hyperlink;
then follow "June 23, 2009" hyperlink) [hereinafter E-BLAST] (warning law firms to be aware of
possible funds schemes).
7.
Gene A. Marsh, Counterfeit Cashier's Check Scams Bank Liability. "The Check Is
Good." Or Is It?, 40 UCC L.J. 417, 418 (2008).
8.
See Bank One, NA v. Dunn, 927 So. 2d 645, 646, 649 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
9.
Hickory Point Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. Kucera (In re Kucera), 373 B.R. 878, 880-81
(C.D. Ill. 2007).
10. See Lucas v. BankAtlantic, 944 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
11. Dunn, 927 So. 2d at 649.
12. Marsh, supra note 7, at 422.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Ulibarri, 557 P.2d 1221, 1222 (Colo. App. 1976)

6.

(involving customer releasing goods to a third party after bank employee stated that the third party's
check "had been paid"); First Ga. Bank v. Webster, 308 S.E.2d 579, 580 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)
(involving bank employee responding that a deposited check was "good" in response to customer's
inquiry); Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188 (Mont. 2006) (involving customer
asking bank employee the duration of the hold period for deposited checks); Burke v. First Peoples
Bank ofN.J., 412 A.2d 1089, 1090 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1980) (involving customer asking bank employee
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means "do I have the money?" 15 However, the bank employee may interpret this
inquiry as merely asking his opinion as to the authenticity of the check. 16 The
employee's response to this question will greatly impact17the highly fact-specific
litigation that will arise if the check is in fact counterfeit.
This Note contends that because of their superior knowledge of banking
operations and greater access to information from the bank that purportedly
issued the counterfeit cashier's check, depositary banks are best positioned to
prevent the losses resulting from these fraudulent schemes. In fact, traditional
negotiable instrument law supports placing the burden of loss on the depositary
bank because it is the least cost risk avoider. 18 Nevertheless, most courts and
commentators interpret the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 19 as imposing the
loss on the customer even if the customer can prove the depositary bank was best
positioned to avoid the loss, the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in
permitting the customer to withdraw uncollected funds, and the loss could have
been avoided had the bank exercised ordinary care. 20 Although a depositary bank
may avoid liability for failing to exercise ordinary care, if the bank's conduct
also failed to satisfy the objective standard of good faith under revised Articles 3
and 4 of the UCC, then the customer may be able to shift the loss to the bank.2 1
Moreover, under certain facts, the bank's communications with the customer
concerning the counterfeit instrument should support a nonstatutory claim, such
as negligent misrepresentation
or equitable estoppel, that would offset the
22
customer's UCC liability.
In addition, this Note addresses the separate problems arising from these
counterfeit cashier's check schemes when the victim is an attorney and the
counterfeit check's dishonor creates a significant negative balance in the
attorney's trust account. Even if the attorney succeeds in shifting the financial
loss resulting from the scheme to the depositary bank, the overdraft of his trust
account may violate the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, which
may result in disciplinary sanctions. 23 While this conduct violates South
Carolina's disciplinary rules, the rules promote the misconception of cashier's

whether money orders were legitimate); Call v. Ellenville Nat'l Bank, 774 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79 (App.
Div. 2004) (involving bank employee responding that a counterfeit check had "cleared" in response

to the customer's inquiry).
15. Marsh, supra note 7, at 425.
16. Id. at 424.
17. Id.at418.
18. See infra Part H.A.
19. Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC were substantially revised in 1990. JAMES J.WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 6 (5th ed. 2000). In this Note, references to
the "UCC" or the "revised UCC" refer to the 1990 revisions and references to the "former UCC"

refer to the original.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part HI.D-F.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra notes 258-300 and accompanying text.
See infra Part VI.A.
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checks being cash equivalents and may contribute to the success of the
counterfeit cashier's check schemes.24
Part II of this Note analyzes the rules for apportioning losses resulting from
check fraud, noting that modem technology has strained these rules but not their
reasoning. Using a legitimate hypothetical cashier's check transaction, Part III
outlines the revised UCC's approach to apportioning liability between the bank
and the customer on the instrument. Part IV explores the banks' and their
customers' relative knowledge concerning cashier's check transactions and
fraudulent schemes. Applying a hypothetical counterfeit scam, Part V considers
possible ways a customer could offset his liability to the bank. Finally, Part VI
examines the ethics considerations arising from a lawyer succumbing to a
counterfeit cashier's check scheme.
II. Loss
A.

APPORTIONMENT DOCTRINE FOR NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

The TraditionalApproach

At the time of the UCC's drafting, the predominant forms of check fraud
were forged drawer's signatures and altered dollar amounts. 25 These forgeries
and alterations were often clumsily performed, making many of these check
fraud schemes readily apparent to a person exercising common ordinary care. 26
The former UCC, as well as its predecessors and the revised UCC, allocated the
loss from forged indorsements and fraudulent alterations to the party taking the
instrument from the fraudster.27 The rationale supporting this general rule is that
if a reasonable inspection of the instrument would reveal the forged indorsement
or alteration, then imposing liability on the party best positioned to prevent the
fraud from occurring-the person taking the instrument from the fraudster-is
justified. 28 In contrast, with respect to forged checks, the former UCC followed
the holding and reasoning of the seminal case of Price v. Nea 2 9 and held the
payor bank liable for the loss.30 As Lord Mansfield stated, "[i]t was incumbent
upon [the drawee], to be satisfied 'that the bill drawn upon him was the drawer's

24. See infra Parts IV, VI.B.
25. Marsh, supra note 7, at 418.
26. See, e.g., Nat'l Dredging Co. v. President of Farmers' Bank of Del., 69 A. 607, 613-14
(Del. 1908) (finding that the different ink and writing angle should have made the bank suspicious
of alteration); St. Charles Mercantile Co. v. Armour & Co., 156 S.C. 397, 401, 153 S.E. 473, 474

(1930) ("It appears from a sight of the instrument that it was originally dated September 1st and
thereafter 'Sept.' was changed to 'Aug."').
27. James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation for Unauthorized Checks,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 453, 453-54 (2004) (citing RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., PAYMENT
SYSTEMS TEACHING MATERIALS 165 (5th ed. 1993)).
28. See id.

29. (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B.).
30. See Rogers, supra note 27, at 458-67 (discussing Price v. Neal as it relates to the former
UCC and the revised UCC).
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hand,' before he accepted or paid it." 31 In other words, the former UCC assumed
that the payor bank knew the signature of the drawer-its customer-and thus
the bank was the "least cost risk avoider" and should be liable for failing to
dishonor a forged check.32
B.

The Effect of Modern Commerce on the TraditionalApproach

The validity of the former UCC's assumption has not withstood the
increases in commercial activity and the technological advances that have
occurred since the 1950s. As a consequence of increased commerce, check usage
rose, which strained the banks' traditional procedure of physically examining
every check presented for payment. 33 In response, banks adopted automated
systems that process checks according to their magnetic ink character
recognition (MICR) lines, which resulted in the vast majority of checks being
processed mainly by machines. 34 This lack of a human presence has undercut the
rationale supporting Price v. Neal because even if the payor bank knows the
drawer's 35
signature, this knowledge is inapplicable when no one inspects the
signature.
In addition, increased commerce resulted in many bank customers utilizing
facsimile signature machines to conduct their businesses efficiently, 36 which also
strains the logic of applying the Price v. Neal rule. To avoid being liable for
paying checks bearing unauthorized or forged signatures, many banks under the
former UCC employed (some may say exploited) the contractual modification
provision 37 to shift the burden of loss to the customer when the customer uses
facsimile signatures to issue checks. 38 However, most courts have enforced a
facsimile signature agreement in forged check cases only when the customer's
negligence contributed to the forged or unauthorized facsimile signature. 39 The

31.
32.

Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 872.
Rogers, supra note 27, at 454, 459 (quoting SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 27, at 165).

33. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4-406 official cmt. 1 (Supp. 2009) (describing MICR
processing as a preferred low cost alternative to physical examination due to high check volume).
34.

See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 16-3(g), at 580.

35. Rogers, supra note 27, at 460.
36. See, e.g., Johnson v. Town of Elizabethtown, 800 F.2d 404, 405 (4th Cir. 1986)
(describing town administrator's use of facsimile signature stamp on town checks); Perini Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 1977) (describing customer's
use of a facsimile signature machine); Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd. v. First Commerce Corp., 669 So.
2d 1298, 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (describing customer's desire to use facsimile signature
machine).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(1) (2003). The variation by agreement provision under the
revised UCC is the same for all intents and purposes. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(a) (Supp.
2009).
38. See Perini,553 F.2d at 400; Jefferson Parish, 669 So. 2d at 1300.
39. Cf Rogers, supra note 27, at 484-96 (arguing enforcement of facsimile signature
agreements depends on "outsider fraud" or "insider fraud"). Compare Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v.
Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 414, 421-22 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (determining facsimile signature agreement
is ambiguous and should be construed against the drafter, the bank, when evidence did not indicate

Published by Scholar Commons, 2010

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

61: 753

varied enforcements of these agreements illustrates the shortcomings of
assuming the payor bank knows the drawer's signature and should bear the loss
in the modem commercial climate where many bank customers, in the name of
efficiency, issue checks without handwritten signatures. 40 Thus, these advances
in issuing and processing checks have made check usage more efficient, but they
have also precluded the payor bank from detecting forged drawers' signatures
through examination of the check. When the payor bank negligently failed to
dishonor a forged check, the former UCC, following Price v. Neal, precluded the
bank from asserting the drawer's negligence to offset its liability. 41 Under the
revised UCC, the Price v. Neal rule is retained, but the payor bank is no longer
precluded, due to its negligence, from asserting that its customer's negligence
contributed to the loss. 42 Moreover, under the revised UCC,43a bank's failure to
review the check's signatures does not constitute negligence.
C. Modern Technology and Counterfeit Checks
While increased commercial activity has led to difficulty in applying the
Price v. Neal rule to traditional forms of forged checks, recent advances in
imaging technology have spawned a new breed of counterfeit checks that can be
indistinguishable from a legitimate draft." Applying the least cost risk avoider
rationale of Price v. Neal is troublesome in these situations because neither the
payor bank nor the party receiving the check from the fraudster would have
knowledge that a perfect counterfeit is not authentic.45 If the counterfeit check is
properly treated as a forged check, then, unless there is a contractual
arrangement to the contrary, 6 the payor bank should avoid liability only if it can

customer's acts led to forgeries), with Wilmington Trust Co. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 273 A.2d 266,
267-68 (Del. 1971) (enforcing facsimile signature agreement when customer's employee
committed the forgery), and Wall v. Hamilton County Bank of Jasper, 276 So. 2d 182, 182-84 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (enforcing facsimile signature agreement when forger stole checks from
customer's cash register and used customer's facsimile signature machine to sign checks). But see
Jefferson Parish, 669 So. 2d at 1300 (enforcing facsimile signature agreement without evidence that
customer's actions led to forgeries).
40. See Rogers, supra note 27, at 484-96.
41. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-3-406, -4-406(2)-(3) (2003).
42. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-406(b), -4-406(d)-(f) (Supp. 2009).

43. Id. § 36-3-103(a)(9).
44. Brandon & Ohre, supra note 3, at 224; Marsh, supra note 7, at 418; see also Wachovia
Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that modem
technology can allow a fraudster to create a new check rather than just altering information name on
an existing check). When the courts know that they are dealing with a counterfeit check as opposed
to an altered check, they have used the rules applicable to forged drawer's signatures. See Chevy
Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 208 F. App'x 232, 234-35 (4th Cir. 2006); Foster
Bancshares,457 F.3d at 622-23.
45. See Brandon & Ohre, supra note 3, at 228-30; Rogers, supranote 27, at 464.
46. See Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd. v. First Commerce Corp., 669 So. 2d 1298, 1300-01 (La.
Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a facsimile signature agreement shifted liability to customer for checks
where the drawer's signature 'resemble[d] the facsimile specimens"').
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47
prove the customer's negligence substantially contributed to the loss.
Moreover, even when the fraudster does not use sophisticated technology to
create a bogus check, federal legislation permitting electronic presentment has
created a problem with apportioning the loss because of the difficulty in
determining whether the check was forged, altered, or counterfeited.4 9
As applied to official checks, this problem is unlikely to arise. As the drawer
of a cashier's check, 50 a payor bank should know the cashier's checks it issues
and the payees of those checks. Consequently, most payor banks presented with
a counterfeit cashier's check likely dishonor the draft rather than pay it.51 Even
though this reasoning is not applicable to teller's checks because the payor bank
is not the drawer,52 electronic advice of drawings (EAOD) services allow payor
banks to determine whether a presented teller's check is counterfeit, altered, or
subject to some other defense.53 An EAOD service allows issuing banks to
submit information, such as the payee and the amount, that allows the payor
bank to identify a teller's or cashier's check.54 If the payor bank is presented
with a teller's or cashier's check whose information does not match the issuing
bank's submission, then the payor bank contacts the issuing bank for payment
instructions.55 Consequently, the issuing bank is alerted to a counterfeit teller's

47. See §§ 36-3-406,-4-406.
48. Check 21 Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (2006).
49. The problem arises when a thief steals a signed check and both the depositary bank and
the payor bank use automated electronic processing systems. See Chevy Chase Bank, 208 F. App'x
at 233; Foster Bancshares, 457 F.3d at 620. Because this type of check processing results in the
destruction of the actual paper check, it is difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether the
thief altered the payee on the actual check or used the stolen check's information to manufacture a
counterfeit check. See Chevy Chase Bank, 208 F. App'x at 233; Foster Bancshares, 457 F.3d at
621-22. Whether a fraudulent check should be considered an alteration or a forgery/counterfeit
when it is electronically presented and the paper copy has been destroyed is an issue that has split
the circuits. Chevy Chase Bank, 208 F. App'x at 236 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). In the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, these checks are presumed to be forgeries/counterfeits, id.
at 235 (majority opinion), while the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
presumes these checks are alterations, Foster Bancshares, 457 F.3d at 622. The practical
importance of whether a check is classified as an alteration or a forgery/counterfeit is the
availability of presentment warranty defenses to the payor bank. See §§ 36-3-407(c), -3-418(c). In
FosterBancshares, Judge Posner opined that the least cost avoider theory for apportioning losses in
these situations fails because perhaps both banks are not in a position to avoid the loss efficiently.
457 F.3d at 623. In Chevy Chase Bank, Judge Shedd apparently rejected this view and deemed the
payor bank as the least cost avoider because it is the party that bears the presumably expensive
burden of producing evidence (i.e., the original check) to show that the check was an alteration and
not a forgery. See 208 F. App'x at 235.
50. § 36-3-104(g).
51. See, e.g., Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188-89 (Mont. 2006)
(involving payor bank dishonoring counterfeit cashier's check); Amthor v. Commerce Bank, No.
SC3311/06, 2007 WL 1299235, at *1 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. May 1, 2007) (same).
52. § 36-3-104(h).
53. See Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., L.L.C. v. Bank of N.Y., 2006 WL 2956333, at *1 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 18, 2006).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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check and can issue a valid stop payment order preventing the loss. 5 6 Although
payor banks and issuing banks are the normal subscribers to EAOD services, 5it
is reasonable to assume that depositary banks would benefit from using these
services as well.58 But before delving too deeply into the intricacies of
counterfeit cashier's check schemes, it is helpful to review the collections
process for a legitimate cashier's check.
III.

LEGITIMATE CASHIER'S CHECK COLLECTIONS PROCESS

A.

Legitimate Cashier's Check Hypothetical

Assume that Legitimate Company (Legitimate), an overseas corporation,
retains Allen Attorney, P.A., a South Carolina law firm owned by Allen, to help
service Legitimate's debt collection activities in the United States. Under their
agreement, Allen will accept payment from Legitimate's American debtors and
deposit those payments into his trust account at First Depositary Bank of
Columbia (First Depositary). 59 After depositing the payments, Allen will wire
these funds, less a servicing fee, to Legitimate's offshore account. 6 0 During
Allen's representation of Legitimate, he is responsible for collecting a debt from
Debbie Debtor (Debbie). Debbie purchases a $500,000 cashier's check from
First Payor Bank of New York (First Payor) payable to the order of Allen
Attorney, P.A., which she sends to Allen to satisfy her debt to Legitimate. Upon
receipt of the cashier's check, Allen deposits it into the trust account at First
Depositary. Two days later, Allen executes a $490,000 wire transfer from his
trust account to Legitimate's offshore account while retaining $10,000 as his
servicing fee. That fee is then transferred from the trust account to the firm's
operating account.

56.

See id. (describing how an EAOD service helps alert the issuing bank to a potentially

fraudulent check and provide the bank an opportunity to issue payment instructions).
57. See id.(noting that both the payor bank and issuing bank in this case used the EAOD
service).

58. Cf id.
(describing a casino's attempt at contacting payor bank to determine the validity of
an altered teller's check before making funds available to the gambler who negotiated the check to
the casino).
59. In South Carolina, all "nominal or short-term funds" a lawyer receives in trust from a
client or third party must be placed in an interest bearing bank account (the Interest on Lawyer Trust
Account (IOLTA) account) that remits the interest or dividends from funds to the South Carolina
Bar Foundation. S.C. APP. CT. R. 412. Debbie's payment will probably be considered "short-term
funds" because Allen most likely will disburse the funds to Legitimate before the accrued interest
revenue exceeds the cost of opening and maintaining a separate account in Legitimate's name. Id.
R. 412(a)(1), (d)(1).

60. Because Allen will not have fully performed under the agreement with Legitimate until
he wires the funds, he likely cannot withdraw his service fee until he executes the funds transfer.
See id.
R. 407, R. 1.15(c).
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The Parties to the Cashier's Check

On these facts, First Payor is the drawer of the cashier's check when its
authorized agent signs the instrument. 61 In addition, as drawer of a cashier's
62
check, First Payor is also the drawee-payor bank. First Payor issues the
63
cashier's check to Debbie when she purchases it. As the issuer of the cashier's
check, First Payor "is obliged to pay the instrument... according to its terms at
the time it was issued ... to a person entitled to enforce the instrument or to an
indorser who paid the instrument., 64 Although the cashier's check is issued to
Debbie, because it66is payable to the order of Allen, Debbie is the remitter 65 and
Allen is the payee.
C. The Remitter's Transfer to the Payee
Even though Debbie, as the remitter, is not a party to the cashier's check, she
owns the instrument until her interest is transferred at negotiation.6867 This transfer
of possession occurs when Debbie mails the check to Allen. Although the
cashier's check is an order instrument, a remitter can negotiate a cashier's check
to a holder without indorsing it.69 Moreover, despite not being a holder of the
cashier's check, 70 as a remitter, Debbie is a nonholder in possession of the
instrument entitled to enforce the instrument.71
As a person entitled to enforce the cashier's check and because the
negotiation of the instrument to Allen is in consideration for the debt to

61.

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103(a)(5) (Supp. 2009).
62. See id. §§ 36-3-103(a)(4), -4-105(3).
63. "Issue" is defined as "the first delivery of an instrument by the maker or drawer, whether
to a holder or nonholder, for the purpose of giving rights on the instrument to any person." Id. § 363-105(a). "Delivery" occurs when possession of the instrument is voluntarily transferred. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-1-201(14) (2003).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-412(i) (Supp. 2009).
65. See id. § 36-3-103(a)(15). However, if the cashier's check had been made payable to
Debbie, then she would be a "holder" of the cashier's check. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(20)
(2003).
66. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109(b) (Supp. 2009).
67. Id. § 36-3-201 official cmt. 2.
68. "Negotiation" is defined as "a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary, of
an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder." Id.
§ 36-3-201(a).
69. See id. § 36-3-201(b). The code defines "indorsement" as "a signature, other than that of
a signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor, that alone or accompanied by other words is made on an
instrument for the purpose of (i) negotiating the instrument, (ii) restricting payment of the
instrument, or (iii) incurring indorser's liability on the instrument." Id. § 36-3-204(a).
70. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(20) (2003) (defining "holder" as the person in
possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable to bearer or to the order of the person in
possession).
71. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-301 official cmt. (Supp. 2009).
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Legitimate, Debbie has made various transfer warranties on the instrument.72
Specifically, Debbie warrants that she is entitled to enforce the cashier's check,
the cashier's check contains only authentic and authorized signatures, the
cashier's check is unaltered, and there are no defenses or claims in recoupment
to the cashier's check.73 Moreover, because she did not indorse the cashier's
check, her transfer warranties are effective only as to Allen and do not attach to
the instrument. 74 Assuming Allen takes the cashier's check in good faith,7 5 if
Debbie breaches one of her transfer warranties, then she is liable to Allen for any
loss he incurs resulting from the breach up to the valid face amount of the
instrument plus expenses and lost interest. 76 Although not explicitly stated in the
statute, her liability for expenses ma include legal fees Allen incurrs resulting
from the breached transfer warranty.
D. The Payee's Deposit of the Cashier's Check
As a consequence of obtaining the cashier's check through negotiation,
Allen is a holder entitled to enforce the instrument.78 When Allen deposits the
cashier's check in his trust account at First Depositary, the bank becomes the
holder of the instrument. 79 Although First Depositary is a holder of the cashier's
check, it is not an owner of the instrument.80 Rather, the bank is an agent of the
owner of the cashier's check during the collections process. 81 The practical result
of First Depositary's agency status is that Allen carries the risk of loss instead of
the bank until final settlement occurs.82 Normally, negotiation of an order
instrument requires the transferor's indorsement. 83 However, when a customer
deposits an instrument at his bank for collection, the bank is considered a holder
even if the instrument does not bear the customer's indorsement. 84 Although it is
unnecessary for Allen to indorse the cashier's check for him to deposit it at First
Depositary, if he were to indorse the instrument, he becomes liable for the
cashier's check amount if it is dishonored.85 This liability extends to both

72. See id. § 36-3-416(a).
73. See id. § 36-3-416(a)(1)-(4).
74. See id. § 36-3-416(a).
75. "Good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing." Id. § 36-3-103(a)(6). For further discussion on the issue of good faith, see
infra Part V.C.
76. § 36-3-416(b).
77. Id. § 36-3-416 official cmt. 6 ("[Attorney's fees] could be granted because they fit within
the phrase 'expenses... incurred as a result of the breach.').
78. See id. § 36-3-301(i).
79. See id. § 36-4-205.
80. See id. § 36-4-201(a).

81. Id.
82. Id. official cmt. 4.
83.
84.
85.

Id. § 36-3-201(b).
Id. § 36-4-205.
Id. § 36-3-415(a).
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persons entitled to enforce the cashier's check and subsequent indorsers who
86
gave value for the instrument .
When Allen deposits the cashier's check into the firm's trust account at First
Depositary, First Depositary may provisionally credit $500,000 to the firm's
account on the day of receipt. 87 Although state law governs when a depositary
bank may provisionally credit a deposited cashier's check to a customer's
account, federal regulations govern when the depositary bank must make these
provisional credits available to the customer for withdrawal. 88 As a general rule,
when a customer deposits a cashier's check, the depositary bank must make the
provisional credit available for withdrawal "not later than the business day after
the banking day on which the funds are deposited." 89 However, because the
cashier's check in this hypothetical exceeds $5,000, First Depositary may
withhold making the provisional credit available
to Allen for withdrawal until
90
the fifth business day after the day of deposit.
E. The Payee's Transfer and Presentment Warranties
Like Debbie, Allen too will make transfer warranties. 91 However, because
most fraudsters abscond from the jurisdiction with their ill-gotten gains, if the
cashier's check is counterfeit and Debbie flees the jurisdiction, then Allen's
transfer warranty will likely be the only one the collecting banks can enforce.92
Allen makes the following transfer warranties to all of the collecting banks,
including First Depositary: the firm is entitled to enforce the cashier's check, the
cashier's check contains only authentic and authorized signatures, the cashier's
check is unaltered, and there are no defenses or claims in recoupment that can be
asserted against the firm on the cashier's check.93 Note that unlike Debbie's
transfer warranties, Allen's transfer warranties not only apply to the initial
transferee, First Depositary, but also to any subsequent transferees that are
collecting banks, such as the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), even if he does not
indorse the instrument.94

86. Id.
87. See id. § 36-4-201(a).
88. Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.10, .12-.13 (2009).
89. Id.§ 229.10(c).
90. Id. § 229.13(b), (h) (allowing depositary banks to withhold availability of deposited
cashier's check funds for five business days if the instrument's amount exceeds $5,000).
91. See § 36-4-207(a).
92. See Brandon & Ohre, supra note 3, at 228 (describing depositary banks and customers as
normal candidates to bear a loss resulting from a counterfeit cashier's check).
93. § 36-4-207(a)(1)-(4). Unlike the Article 4 transfer warranties, id., the Article 3 transfer
warranties will extend only to subsequent transferors if the transferee-Allen-indorses the
instrument. Id. § 36-3-416(a). Due to this conflict, when an item is deposited at a bank for
collections, the Article 4 transfer warranties govern. See id.§ 36-4-102(a).
94. Compare id. § 36-4-207(a) (extending all Article 4 transfer warranties to subsequent
collecting banks), with id.§ 36-3-416(a) (extending Article 3 transfer warranties to subsequent
transferors only if the instrument is indorsed).
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Although Allen makes transfer warranties to First Depositary and FRB,
these warranties do not extend to First Payor because it is not a collecting bank.95
Rather, First Payor receives Allen's presentment warranties because he deposited
the cashier's check to obtain payment from First Payor. 96 Moreover, First Payor
also receives presentment warranties from the collecting banks.97 Consequently,
Allen, First Depositary, and the FRB make the following presentment warranties
to First Payor: the warrantor is entitled to enforce the cashier's check, which in
effect means the cashier's check contains only authentic and authorized
indorsements and no indorsements are missing; the cashier's check is unaltered;
and the warrantor does not know that the drawer's signature is unauthorized.98
However, these warranties will arise only if First Payor pays the cashier's
check. 99

F. FinalPayment, the Right of Charge Back, and the Right of Refund
Although Regulation CC requires First Depositary to make the cashier's
check funds available to Allen by the fifth business day after the banking day of
deposit, 100 this does not mean Allen has received payment for the cashier's
check. Rather, the provisional credit and its availability represent only
uncollected funds, and these funds will not be considered collected until First
Depositary receives final settlement from First Payor. 1°1 There are only three
ways First Depositary can receive final payment from First Payor: First Payor
pays cash for the instrument; 10 2 First Payor settles for the cashier's check without
a statutory or contractual right to revoke settlement; 103 or First Payor
provisionally settles for the cashier's check with a statutory or contractual right
10 4
to revoke but fails to do so in accordance with the relevant statute or contract.
In other words, First Payor's settlement for the cashier's check will become final
only when First Depositary receives usable funds.10 5 Upon First Depositary's
receipt of final settlement from First Payor, Allen's provisional credit becomes
106
final
and represents
collected funds.
Until
occurs, Allen
1 07 be liable to
First Depositary
for withdrawing
available
butthis
uncollected
funds.may

95. See id. §§ 36-4-105(5),-4-207(a).
96. See id. §§ 36-3-417(a), -4-208(a).
97. Id. §§ 36-3-417(a), -4-208(a).
98. Id. §§ 36-3-417(a)(1)-(4),-4-208(a)(1)-(3).
99. Id. §§ 36-3-417(a), -4-208(a).
100. Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.13(b), (h) (2009).
101. See § 36-4-215(b), (d).
102. See id. § 36-4-215(a)(1).
103. See id. § 36-4-215(a)(2).
104. Id. § 36-4-215(a)(3); see also id. § 36-4-301(a)-(b) (granting multiple statutory rights to
payor banks to revoke provisional settlements).
105. See id. § 36-4-302 official cmt. 2.
106. See id. § 36-4-215(d).
107. See id. § 36-4-214(a).
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Consequently, until First Depositary receives final settlement, it retains the
rights of charge back and refund. 10 8 The right of charge back allows First
Depositary to revoke the provisional credit for the cashier's check in the trust
account if the instrument is dishonored, as well as to withdraw any existing
collected funds attributable to other clients if Allen has already spent a portion of
the provisional credit. 109 Thus, if Allen's trust account has a balance of $1.2
million-$500,000 attributable to the provisional credit extended on the
cashier's check and $700,000 in collected funds-then First Depositary may
revoke the $500,000 provisional credit pursuant to its right of charge back,
resulting in a going forward account balance of $700,000.11° Moreover, if Allen
has disbursed $250,000 of the provisional credit and the trust account also
contains $700,000 of collected funds, then, upon dishonor, First Depositary's
right of charge back allows the bank to revoke the remaining provisional credit
and to withdraw the difference between the revoked provisional credit and the
face amount of the dishonored instrument from collected funds.111 Consequently,
under this scenario, after First Depositary exercises its right of char§e back,
Allen's trust account would have a going forward balance of $450,000.1
While the right of charge back allows First Depositary to recover the face
amount of the dishonored cashier's check from funds (collected and uncollected)
in Allen's trust account, First Depositary's right of refund allows the bank to
13
recover on the dishonored cashier's check from Allen personally.'
Consequently, if at the time of dishonor the trust account's balance is $250,000,
then First Depositary may exercise both its right of charge back and right of
refund.' 14 First Depositary's right of charge back entitles it to withdraw the
$250,000 in the account, and its right of refund entitles it to pursue Allen
personally
to recover the $250,000 that could not be obtained through charge
15
back.m
Although the rights of charge back and refund sound similar, there are
differences. One difference is that a depositary bank that negligently handles an
instrument retains the right of charge back while the bank's right of refund will
be subject to the UCC's comparative fault provisions.' 16 Moreover, unlike the
right of refund, the right of charge back allows a depositary bank to recover
collected funds from its customer immediately. 117 While the average bank
customer may not view this difference as noteworthy, if the customer is a lawyer
and the charge back is applied to collected funds in the lawyer's trust account,

108. Id.

109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. § 36-4-214(d) & official cmt. 5.
Id. § 36-4-214(a).
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then the lawyer may face serious disciplinary actions. 118 Moreover, the lawyer
will face civil liability resulting from his warranties, his indorser's obligation,
and the depositary bank's rights of refund and charge back.
IV. CASHIER'S CHECKS ARE NOT CASH

As one commentator describes it, "[t]he 'mystique' applied to a genuine
cashier's check explains in part why they have become an attractive vehicle for
fraud when used for payments to consumers."119 This mystique often arises
because, under the UCC, a genuine and unaltered cashier's check "offer[s] a
certain security and peace of mind that a plain old check does not., 120 As the
official comments explain, a cashier's check "is taken by the creditor as a cash
equivalent on the assumption that the bank will pay the check., 121 The New
Jersey Superior Court summarized the reasoning of viewing cashier's checks as
cash equivalents:
A cashier's check circulates in the commercial world as the equivalent
of cash. People accept a cashier's check as a substitute for cash because
the bank stands behind it, rather than an individual. In effect, the bank
becomes a guarantor of the value of the check and pledges its
122 resources
to the payment of the amount represented upon presentation.
Evidence of the widespread assumption that cashier's checks are cash
equivalents can be found not only in cases arising from the dishonor of123a
cashier's check but also in South Carolina's Rules of Professional Conduct.
Consequently, it is not surprising that payees, including attorneys, who deposit
apparently authentic cashier's checks in their accounts assume there is no risk of

118. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 1.15(f); see also In re Craig, 317 S.C. 295, 298-99, 454
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1995) (disciplining attorney for having multiple overdrafts and negative balances
in his trust account); In re Abney, 316 S.C. 182, 184-85, 447 S.E.2d 848, 849-50 (1994) (disbarring
an attorney for multiple professional conduct violations, including having a negative balance in his

trust account).
119. Marsh, supra note 7, at 421.
120. Id.
121. § 36-3-411 official cmt. 1.
122. Nat'l Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970) (citation omitted) (citing Scharz v. Twin City State Bank, 441 P.2d 897, 899 (Kan. 1968));
accord Flatiron Linen, Inc. v. First Am. State Bank, 23 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Colo. 2001) ("People

accept cashier's checks as a substitute for cash because the bank, not an individual, stands behind it.
By issuing a cashier's check, the bank becomes a guarantor of the value of the check and pledges its
resources to the payment of the amount represented upon presentation.").
123. See S.C. App. CT. R. 407, R. 1.15(f) (allowing attorneys to treat cashier's checks as
collected funds with respect to funds disbursal from trust accounts).
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the check being dishonored. 124 Furthermore, the depositary bank has reason to
know that its customers, in making this125assumption, believe that they have
received a final and irrevocable settlement.
Although one official comment suggests that cashier's checks are cash
equivalents, I 26 under limited circumstances, a bank may refuse to honor 127a
cashier's check without incurring any liability to the holder of the instrument.
A bank rightfully dishonors a cashier's check when it asserts its own defenses as
opposed to the remitter's defenses to the underlying transaction. 128 In addition, a
bank properly dishonors a cashier's check if it joins the remitter to the action and
the remitter successfully raises his defenses to payment.1 29 In the words of
Barkley and Barbara Clark, the UCC's cash equivalence language merely
reflects the banks' inability to raise the remitter's defenses on their own:
Cashier's checks are indeed considered to be cash equivalents, even
under the Revised UCC, but that characterization goes more to the fact
that the remitter has no right to stop payment and no right to force the
issuing bank to stop payment. That is 95 percent of the cases. In the
remaining 5 percent, where the issuing bank itself never received
payment for the check, it should be able to refuse payment as against a
holder (including the remitter) who does not qualify as a holder in due
course. If the drafters of the revised UCC had intended to codify a "pure
cash-equivalence" theory, under which the issuing bank has no right to
stop payment under any circumstances, it would have said so clearly.
Instead, we are left with Revised UCC § 3-422(c)(ii) [enacted in South
Carolina Code section 36-3-411] and the Official Comment, which cut
the other way.30
Consequently, the UCC's somewhat schizophrenic depiction of cashier's
checks as cash equivalents has resulted in some courts treating them like cash
3
and
others
treating
like negotiable
If the then
courts
clearly
recognize
thatthem
cashier's
checks are instruments.1
not cash equivalents,
it iscannot
more

124. See FlatironLinen, 23 P.3d at 1213 (citing Shari Barron, Comment, Bossuyt v. Osage
Farmers National Bank: Cashier'sChecks Under the Iowa Uniform Commercial Code, 73 IOWA L.
REv. 521, 521 (1988)).
125. See id.
126. See § 36-3-411 official cmt. 1.
127. See id.§ 36-3-411 & official cmt. 3; Transcon. Holding Ltd. v. First Banks, Inc., 299
S.W.3d 629, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ("[W]e hold that First Bank could refuse payment and assert
its own defenses against liability on its cashier's checks.").
128. See § 36-3-411 official cmt. 3.
129. See id.
130. 1 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS

AND CREDIT CARDS 3.06[3][b][ii] at 3-186 (rev. ed. 2009).
131. Transcon.Holding, 299 S.W.3d at 646-47.
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than fair to assume that the average consumer will fail to make this distinction as
well.
Attempting to prevent consumers from becoming victims of counterfeit
cashier's check schemes, the OCC issued the following explanation for why
people trust cashier's checks:
Many consumers have become victims of scams involving a
fraudulent cashier's check .

.

.

. Cashier's checks are viewed as

relatively risk-free instruments and, therefore, are often used as a trusted
form of payment to consumers for goods and services.
However, cashier's checks lately have become an attractive vehicle
for fraud when used for payments to consumers. Although the amount
of a cashier's check quickly becomes "available" for withdrawal by the
consumer after the consumer deposits the check, these funds do not
belong to the consumer if the check proves to be fraudulent. It may take
weeks to discover that a cashier's check is fraudulent. In the meantime,
the consumer may have irrevocably wired the funds to a scam artist or
otherwise used the funds-only to find out later, when the fraud is
detected-that the consumer owes the132bank the full amount of the
cashier's check that had been deposited.
In addition to the OCC's consumer notification, newspapers nationwide
have chronicled the increased occurrences of counterfeit cashier's check fraud
133
schemes and bank customers' misplaced sense of security in cashier's checks.
However, despite these warnings, counterfeiters likely will continue to find
unsuspecting prey.
Bank customers are not the only people with this erroneous belief that
cashier's checks are always secure. For example, prior to the dramatic rise of
counterfeit cashier's checks experienced nationwide over the past several

132. OCC CA 2007-1, supranote 6.
133. See, e.g., Kurt Blumenau, A Cashier'sCheck Is Safe, Right? Wrong; PopularScams Use
Victims' Trust to Take Their Money, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), July 22, 2007, at Al

(describing the increase of counterfeit cashier's check fraud schemes and potential ways banks and
customers can avoid them); Sarah Colwell, Colorado Springs FinancialBriefs: April 20, 2007,
COLO. SPRINGS BUS. J., Apr. 20, 2007 (describing the FDIC's reestablishment of the Check Fraud

Working Group due to the increase in counterfeit cashier's check fraud); Feds Warn About Mailed
Check Scam, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 18, 2007, at C2 (describing government regulators'

notification to bank customers of counterfeit cashier's check fraud schemes); K.C. Myers, Bogus
IslandBank Checks Used in Scam, CAPE COD TIMES, Sept. 12, 2008 (describing a national mystery

shopper scheme involving issuances of counterfeit cashier's checks); Julie Tripp, Managing Your
Money-Check Holds Can Tie Up Fundsfor Days, SUNDAY OREGONIAN (Portland), Apr. 22, 2007,

at D1 (explaining that bank's extended holds on cashier's checks are used to avoid counterfeit check
scams).
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years, 134 even a spokesman for the FDIC had viewed "'cashier's checks as being
the same as cash."', 135 Due to these misconceptions, both the FDIC and the OCC
have issued warnings to national banks of the potential for counterfeit cashier's
check fraud scams. 136 The OCC's bank notification describes the common
scenarios these scams may take, and it requests that banks be especially vigilant
when taking a cashier's check for deposit:
[T]he consumer believes that the cashier's check is valid and deposits
the check into a deposit account. After the depositary bank makes the
fnds available to the consumer, the consumer sends goods or, where
requested, funds to the third party. Some time later, the check is returned
unpaid by the paying bank because the check is discovered to be
fraudulent. The depositary bank then reverses the credit to the
consumer's account. As a result of this check fraud, the consumer
suffers a loss of the goods sold, the funds wired, or both.
It can be very difficult to detect fraudulent cashier's checks in these
scenarios. Fraud perpetrators may employ various devices to delay or
make more difficult the detection of the fraud. For example, the check
may be drawn on a bank located in a different check processing region
than the region in which the depositor is located. Fraud perpetrators also
may take actions to make the transaction look as genuine as possible,
such as using-and altering-a genuine check. Checks may also list the
name of one bank, but contain the routing number for another bank.
Similarly, the perpetrator may deliberately make part of the check
illegible in order to ensure 137
that the check must be handled manually,
slowing its processing time.
Through these warnings, federal regulators have placed both banks and their
customers on notice of the possibility of counterfeit cashier's check fraud scams.
Despite these notifications, bank customers in general, and attorneys in
particular, are still falling prey to these schemes. 138 The resulting litigation often
focuses on who should bear the loss or, in other words, who is the least cost
avoider-the bank customer who fell for the139"get rich quick" scheme or the bank
that failed to warn of the potential of fraud.

134. From 2004 to 2006, the FDIC's annual number of "Special Alerts primarily concerning
counterfeit cashier's checks" more than tripled from 106 in 2004 to 342 in 2006. FDIC REPORT,
supranote 1.
135. Blumenau, supra note 133.
136. FDIC REPORT, supranote 1; OCC BULL. NO. 2007-2, supranote 3.
137. OCC BULL. No. 2007-2, supra note 3.

138. See, e.g., Lucas v. BankAtlantic, 944 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(describing an attorney falling prey to a money transfer agent scheme).
139. See, e.g., White v. Hancock Bank, 477 So. 2d 265, 268 (Miss. 1985) ("'[in my opinion

the bank was not at fault .... The [customer], it seems, was dealing with a bunch of crooks ....
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V. THE NIGERIAN SCHEME AS APPLIED TO LAWYERS

A.

NigerianScheme Hypothetical

After completing his representation of Legitimate, Allen receives an email
purportedly from Louis Sketchd (Louis), the president of Roi de Contrefagon,
Inc. (RCI), asking Allen to represent RCI in essentially the same fashion as he
did Legitimate. Although Allen's representation of Legitimate went without
incident, some recent South Carolina Bar publications have made him wary of
doing collections work for unknown foreign corporations. 14 Consequently,
Allen researches RCI on the internet and discovers RCI's website, www.RCIintl.be 1 41 After reviewing the website, Allen believes that RCI is an actual
company. However, to be on the safe side, Allen emails Louis stating that he is
willing to perform collections work for the company, but RCI must first send
him an official copy of the company's articles of incorporation. Louis promptly
responds to Allen's email, stating that the requested documents will be mailed
shortly.
A week after receiving Louis's second email, a package arrives at Allen's
office containing RCI's articles of incorporation. After a thorough examination
of the document, Allen concludes that RCI is a real Belgian corporation and that
he will perform collections work for its American accounts. Consequently, Allen
and Louis enter into a legal services contract. Under the agreement, Allen is to
contact RCI's American debtors, beginning with the largest past-due accounts,
and offer to settle their debt to RCI if the debtors pay ninety percent of the
amount due in the form of a cashier's, teller's, or certified check within one
month. Upon receipt of these payments, Allen must deposit the checks into his
trust account at First Depositary. Moreover, Allen must execute a funds transfer
from this account that ultimately sends the payments, less a 2% servicing fee, to
RCI's account at the Brussels branch of Banque de La Poste (BLP).
Of RCI's supposed debtors, Degrelle Importers (Degrelle), allegedly a
Seattle-based importer of, among other things, waffle irons, has the largest pastdue account in the amount of $10 million. Pursuant to his agreement with RCI,
Allen mails a letter to Degrelle's address, which RCI had provided, stating that
Degrelle must send Allen a cashier's, teller's, or certified check in the amount of
$9 million within thirty days or face legal action. Three weeks after mailing the
letter, Allen receives a $9 million cashier's check and a letter stating the check is
payment for Degrelle's outstanding debt to RCI. The cashier's check identifies
Seattle Payor Bank (SPB) as the drawer and is payable to the order of "Allen

I think it would be unjust to make the bank stand for the loss."'). In this case, the court was dealing
with a forged certified check. Id. at 267.
140. See Higgens, supra note 6; E-BLAST, supra note 6.

141. This is not a real Web site at the time of writing this Note. In addition, www.RCI.be is
the Belgian Web site of an international time share company. This Note does not intend to imply
that the international time share company is involved in any illegal action.
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Attorney, P.A." Moreover, SPB's insignia, the letters S,P, and B in script over a
rising sun, is on the top left corner of the instrument.
After receiving the cashier's check from Degrelle, Allen properly indorses
the instrument and instructs his law clerk Lucy to deposit the check into his trust
account at First Depositary. In addition, Allen requests that Lucy ask the teller
how long it will take for the cashier's check to clear because he intends to wire
the check proceeds to RCI's account at BLP as soon as possible. Lucy dutifully
performs Allen's requests. In response to her inquiry, the teller states that First
Depositary's policy is to make deposited official checks available for withdrawal
the day after deposit unless the customer's account history raises suspicion. The
teller then reviews the trust account's history, and seeing that it had a high
average balance while never having an overdraft, the teller informs Lucy that the
fnds would be available to transfer the next day. Moreover, the teller adds that
banks cannot dishonor cashier's checks and that Allen could treat them like cash.
Hearing this, Lucy deposits the cashier's check into the trust account. Prior to the
deposit, the account contained $1 million attributable to Allen's other clients. By
the close of business on the day after deposit, the account has an available
balance of $10 million.
Two days later, Allen goes to First Depositary to execute a funds transfer in
the amount of $8,820,000 to RCI's account at BLP. Prior to executing the funds
transfer, Allen asks First Depositary's branch manager whether the trust account
has a sufficient balance to cover the funds transfer. She responds that the account
has an available balance of $10 million. In addition, the manager reiterates the
teller's statement that Allen could treat the cashier's check like cash. Satisfied
with her response, Allen executes the funds transfer. 142 Two days later, First
Depositary receives the cashier's check, which SPB has dishonored and returned.
Accompanying the returned cashier's check is a letter from SPB stating that it
had neither issued a cashier's check payable to Allen Attorney, P.A, nor had it
issued a cashier's check corresponding to the check number of the instrument
presented. Moreover, the letter states that SPB believes the cashier's check is a
pure counterfeit, as opposed to an alteration or forgery, because SPB's insignia is

142. The communications between Allen, Lucy, and First Depositary's employees are based
on the exchanges that Charles Hughes, a bank customer, had with Nancy Smith and Milanna Shear,
bank employees, in Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188 (Mont. 2006). In his
deposition, Hughes testified to having the following conversation with Smith prior to depositing the
check:
Well, my question was, how long do you have to hold money to have-how long do
you have to hold these checks before they're sufficient funds; I think the bank calls them
collected funds. And she said, these are official checks, Chuck. These two big ones are
official checks. You will be transferring these? And I said I will be transferring a large
sum. We'll have to determine next week what it will be. And she says, official checks,
same as cash. You can do whatever you want to do.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Smith stated "that official checks were 'just like'
cashier's checks." Id. Moreover, faced with the same question, Shear "told Hughes to believe
whatever Smith said regarding the validity of the checks." Id.
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the words "SEATTLE PAYOR BANK" listed beneath a soaring eagle rather than its
initials over a rising sun.
Upon receiving the returned cashier's check and accompanying letter from
SPB, First Depositary attempts to cancel the payment order it executed two days
before. 143 However, by this time, Louis has already closed RCI's account with
BLP and absconded with the funds. After learning that it cannot reverse the
funds transfer, First Depositary immediately exercises its right of charge back
against Allen's IOLTA account in the amount of $1,180,000 (the $1 million
representing Allen's other clients' funds and the $180,000 representing Allen's
fee from RCI). In addition, First Depositary notifies Allen that the check has
been dishonored, the bank has exercised its right of charge back, and pursuant to
its right of refund, Allen is liable to the bank for the remainder of the dishonored
check amount, $7,640,000.
B. DepositaryBank's Claims Against the Customer
Under the facts set forth above, First Depositary has multiple causes of
action against Allen to collect the remaining $7,640,000. First, Allen is liable to
the bank pursuant to its right of refund. 144 Second, because SPB neither issued
the instrument nor signed it, Allen breached the authentic and authorized
signature transfer warranty. 145 Third, as an indorser of a dishonored instrument,
Allen is liable to First Depositary for the face amount of the cashier's check
under his indorser's obligation. 146 In response to First Depositary's claims, Allen
will find little solace in the UCC.
First Depositary's right of charge back is virtually unlimited, and Allen will
have very little success challenging the propriety of the bank exercising that right
under the UCC. Under the UCC, a depositary bank that extends a provisional
credit to its customer for an instrument that is later dishonored may charge back
the credit extended even if it failed to exercise ordinary care in handling the
instrument.1 47 Consequently, First Depositary "can enforce its right to charge
back even if [its] negligence caused" the instrument to be dishonored.

143. First Depositary's right and ability to cancel the payment order to BLP, along with other
potential issues arising under Article 4A, are beyond the scope of this Note. That being said, after
BLP, the beneficiary's bank, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4A-103(a)(3) (2003), accepts the payment
order and credits the funds to the account of RCI, the beneficiary, see id. § 36-4A-103(a)(2), BLP
would have to agree to cancel the payment order, see id. § 36-4A-21 1(c). Because cancelling the
payment order at this point is in the beneficiary bank's discretion, id., it is highly unlikely that BLP
would cancel First Depositary's payment order after the funds are withdrawn from RCI's account.
144. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4-214(a) (Supp. 2009).
145. See id. §§ 36-3-416(a)(2), -4-207(a)(2). Because Degrelle's cashier's check was a pure
counterfeit as opposed to an alteration of a valid cashier's check, Allen did not breach the unaltered
instrument transfer warranty. See id. §§ 36-3-416(a)(3), -4-207(a)(3).
146. See id. § 36-3-415(a).
147. Id. § 36-4-214(d)(2).
148. Id. § 36-4-214 reporter's cmt.
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Although its negligence does not affect its right of charge back, First Depositary
remains liable for failing to exercise ordinary care. 49 However, the scope of
First Depositary's duty under the UCC is likely limited to exercising its statutory
collections obligations with ordinary care. 150 Because First Depositary satisfied
these statutory requirements under these facts, Allen's statutory protection from
First Depositary's charge back "is found in the general obligation of good
faith. 151 If he can show the bank acted in bad faith, then his remedy
will offset
152
the charge back and potentially provide consequential damages.
Moreover, First Depositary's refund, breach of transfer warranty, and
indorser's liability claims against Allen will find little resistance under the UCC.
Unlike First Depositary's right of charge back, these claims against Allen are
subject to his claim that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care while handling
the instrument.1 53 Exercising "ordinary care" is defined as observing the
"reasonable commercial standards" for the industry and locality of the party. 154
Furthermore, handling of an instrument as applied to banks has been interpreted
as the bank's activities with respect to processing and collecting the
instrument. 155 Here, Allen likely does not have a claim against First Depositary
for failing to exercise ordinary care in handling the instrument.
Under these facts, First Depositary observed reasonable banking standards
during the collections process for the cashier's check. First Depositary timely
sent the cashier's check for collections and timely gave notice to Allen of
dishonor.1 56 Moreover, a majority of banks provide provisional settlements and
availability for "cash items, ' 157 such as the cashier's check in question.
Consequently, First Depositary most likely exercised ordinary care while
handling the cashier's check. Thus, Allen most likely does not have a specific
statutory defense or counterclaim to offset First Depositary's refund, breach of

149. See id. § 36-4-214(d)(2).

150. See id. § 36-4-202(a).
151. Id. § 36-4-214 official cmt. 5.
152. See id. § 36-4-103(e).
153. See id. § 36-3-415(a) ("[A]n indorser is obliged to pay the amount due on the
instrument .... "); id. § 36-4-103(e) ("The measure of damages for failure to exercise ordinary care
in handling an item is the amount of the item reduced by an amount that could not have been
realized by the exercise of ordinary care."); id. § 36-4-207(c) ("A person ... may recover from the
warrantor as damages for breach of warranty an amount equal to the loss suffered as a result of the
breach ....
); id. § 36-4-214 reporter's cmt. ("[I]f the collecting bank seeks to recover a refund
from its customer ... the customer can assert the bank's failure to exercise ordinary care as a
defense ... ").
154. Id. § 36-3-103(a)(9). Moreover, with respect to banks in the collections process,
exercising ordinary care does not require it to physically inspect deposited instrunents unless the
bank's internal procedures require such an examination. Id.
155. See Valley Bank ofRonan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 191 (Mont. 2006).
156. § 36-4-202(b) ("A collecting bank exercises ordinary care ... by taking proper action
before its midnight deadline following receipt of an item, notice, or settlement.").
157. Id. § 36-4-214 official cmt. 1.
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transfer warranty, or indorser's
obligation causes of action other than the bank's
158
failure to act in good faith.
C. Bank's Bad Faith as a Defense for the Customer
1. Good Faith Under the Revised UCC
Because First Depositary likely handled the counterfeit cashier's check with
ordinary care, Allen's sole defense under the UCC is to prove the bank acted in
bad faith. 159 Article 1 of the UCC "imposes an obligation of good faith" in the
performance of all contracts and duties that the statute governs. 160 Under South
Carolina's version of Article 1, the obligation to perform in good faith requires
parties only to meet a subjective "honesty in fact" standard. 161 However, the
1990 revisions to the UCC included a new definition of good faith applicable
under Articles 3 and 4 that requires "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." 162 Thus, as applied to
transactions involving cashier's checks, a party must
do more than simply be
16 3
honest in fact to satisfy its obligation of good faith.
Under the revised definition of good faith, a party must satisfy both an
objective and a subjective test to fulfill its obligation of good faith. 164 To satisfy
the subjective test, a party must observe "the 'pure heart and empty head'
standard., 165 Consequently, a party must be honest in fact, which requires no
knowledge of illegality or defects affecting the instrument. 166 However, the
addition of an objective test to the good faith obligation requires "[t]he pure
heart of the [party to] be accompanied by reasoning that assures conduct
comporting with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." 167 Although

158. See id.official cmt. 5 ("The customer's protection is found in the general obligation of
good faith ....).
159. See id.
160. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-203 (2003).
161. See id. § 36-1-201(19) ('Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."); id.§ 36-1-203 official cmt. (noting that Article 2's definition of good faith imposes an
additional objective standard). In 2001, the American Law Institute approved a revised Article I to
the UCC. Under revised Article 1, good faith 'means honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (Proposed Draft, May 2001)
(emphasis added). South Carolina has not yet adopted revised Article 1. References in this Note to
the revised definition of good faith refer to the Article 3 revision as opposed to the Article 1
revision.
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103(a)(6) (Supp. 2009); see id.§ 36-4-104(c).
163. See id.§ 36-3-103 official cmt. 4.
164. Id. ("The definition [of good faith] requires not only honesty in fact but also 'observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."').
165. Me. Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 727 A.2d 335, 340
(Me. 1999).
166. See id.at 341-42.
167. Id. at 342.
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the UCC does not define "fair dealing," 168 it does distinguish the concept of fair
dealing from the idea of ordinary care:
Although fair dealing is a broad term that must be defined in context, it
is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the
care with which an act is performed. Failure to exercise ordinary care in
conducting a transaction is an entirely different concept than failure to
deal fairly in conducting the transaction. Both fair dealing and ordinary
care, which is defined in Section 3-103(a)[(9)], are to be judged in the
light of reasonable commercial standards, but those standards
in each
169
case are directed to different aspects of commercial conduct.
Thus, to satisfy the objective prong of the good faith obligation, a party's
conduct must "comport[] with industry or 'commercial' standards applicable to
the transaction," and "those standards [must be] reasonable standards intended to
result in fair dealing." 170 Consequently, a party may act in good faith "where it
acts pursuant to ... reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing-even if it
is negligent-but may [be found to have not acted in good faith], even where it
complies with commercial standards,
if those standards are not reasonably
171
related to achieving fair dealing.,
In Maine Family Federal Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada,172 a leading case interpretating the revised definition of good faith, the
Maine Supreme Court held that a jury could reasonably conclude that a bank
acted in bad faith when it made provisional credit immediately available for
withdrawal on three large out-of-state checks. 173 In determining the reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the banking industry, the court found that
the issue of good faith was one of fact and that "[t]he factfinder must consider all

168. Id. at 342-43.
169. § 36-3-103 official cmt. 4.
170. Me. Family, 727 A.2d at 343.
171. Id.
172. 727 A.2d 335 (Me. 1999). Maine Family involved the life insurance proceeds of Elden
Guerrette (Elden). Id. at 336-37. Elden's life insurance policy with Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada (Sun Life) named his three children, Daniel, Joel, and Claire, as equal beneficiaries, and
upon Elden's death in 1995, each child received a check for $40,759.35 drawn on Sun Life's
account at Chase Manhattan Bank in Syracuse, New York. Id. Sun Life's agent, Steven Hall, and
his associate, Paul Richard, fraudulently induced the children to negotiate the Sun Life checks to
them as an investment in Hall and Richard's company. Id. at 337. Richard deposited the checks into
his account at Maine Family Federal Credit Union (Credit Union), which made the funds
immediately available for withdrawal. Id. Quickly regretting their decision, the Guerrette children
asked Sun Life to stop payment on the checks, which it did the day after Richard deposited the
checks at the Credit Union. Id. The Credit Union received notice of dishonor six business days after
deposit, but Richard had already withdrawn $122,278.05, representing the provisional credit given
for the checks. See id. The Credit Union presumably charged back almost $80,000 that remained in
Richard's account when the bank received notice of dishonor, and the case focused on who should
be liable for the remaining $42,366.56. See id.
173. Id. at 344.
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of the facts relevant to the transaction." 174 Consequently, the terms of the bank's
internal policy, the law governing the transaction in question, and the parties to
and size of the instrument in question
were appropriate facts to consider in
175
determining a party's good faith.
With respect to the bank's internal policy, the court considered whether it set
forth mandatory guidelines or created discretionary power on placing holds on
deposited items. 176 The court implied that an unwritten, internal policy that
provided discretionary power, especially to lower level bank employees, was
indicative of the bank's bad faith. 177 Moreover, the court examined the bank's
internal policy to ensure that it complied with applicable law. 178 However, the
court noted that the law governing the transaction "does not itself establish [a]
reasonable commercial standard of fair dealing., 179 Rather, the governing law
sets the outer limits of acceptable commercial practices, but individual
transactions may require a higher standard of fair dealing. 180 Thus, although not
dispositive, a jury is entitled to consider Regulation CC's provisions on holding
large, nonlocal checks when determining if making funds available to a customer
on such a check breaches the bank's obligation of good faith. 181 After making
these determinations, the court held that a jury could reasonably find that a bank
breaches its duty of good faith when
it fails to place a hold on a large, out-of182
state check for a reasonable time.
In Maine Family, the parties to the checks and the check amounts arguably
should have raised the Credit Union's suspicions. The checks were for equal
amounts, issued to three payees with the same last name, drawn on a life
insurance company's account, and deposited into a third party's account that had
no discernable relationship with the named payees. 183 Although these facts,
without more, may not have proven that fraud was afoot, they reflected a
substantial risk that the person depositing the checks may have wrongfully
deprived the payees, through fraud or theft, of their payments as beneficiaries
under a life insurance policy. As a result, the Credit Union had notice of facts
suggesting that granting immediate availability to the funds representing the
checks could further a scheme to defraud the beneficiaries. This notice of a
potential scheme to defraud, though not addressed in the court's opinion, is
perhaps the most compelling argument supporting the court's holding that a jury

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See id.("Moreover, the Credit Union had no written policy explicitly guiding its staff
regarding the placing of a hold on uncollected funds. Rather, the decision on whether to place a
temporary hold on an account was left to the 'comfort level' of the teller accepting the deposit.").
178. Id.at 343.
179. Id.at 344.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id.at 336-37.
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analyzing the totality of the circumstances may reasonably find that a bank failed
to exercise commercially reasonable standards of fair dealing when it made
funds immediately available despite being legally allowed to withhold
availability for a longer period.
In In re Jersey Tractor Trailer TrainingInc., 184 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit applied Maine Family's two-step inquiry for
determining whether a party's conduct comported with reasonable standards of
fair dealing. 185 Jersey Tractor Trailer involved Wawel Savings Bank (Wawel)
obtaining a security interest on all of debtor Jersey Tractor Trailer Training,
1
Inc.'s (JTTT) "capital equipment and assets" to secure a $315,000 loan. 6
Wawel perfected this security interest when it filed a financing statement under
JTTT's correct name. 187 Subsequently, JTTT entered into an agreement with a
factor, Yale Factors, L.L.C. (Yale).1 8 Under the JTTT-Yale agreement, JTTT
promised to sell its accounts to Yale for less than face value, which directly
violated the terms of the JTTT-Wawel loan agreement. 189 The accounts at issue
appear to be the tuition obligations of would-be truck drivers. 190 Moreover,
invoices associated with the accounts receivable were the instruments giving rise
to Yale's claim. 19 1
Article 9 governed JTTT's192agreements with both Wawel and Yale because it
applies to the sale of accounts. As the buyer of accounts receivable, the JTTTYale agreement gave Yale a security interest in the accounts. 193 To ensure its
security interest would not be subordinate to a third party's security interest,
Yale retained Dun & Bradstreet to perform monthly lien searches on "Jersey
Tractor Trailer Training."'1 94 Apparently, because the lien search omitted the
word "Inc." from JTTT's name, it did not disclose Wawel's outstanding
lien on
195
the accounts receivable for "Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc."

184. 580 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009).
185. Id. at 157 ("Our inquiry, therefore, contains two steps: '[F]irst whether the conduct of the
holder [of the instruments] comported with industry or "commercial" standards applicable to the
transactions and, second, whether those standards were reasonable standards intended to result in
fair dealing."' (alterations in original) (quoting Me. Family, 727 A.2d at 343)).
186. Id. at 148-50.
187. See id. at 150 n.3.

188. Id. at 150.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 150-52.
192. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(a)(3) (2003). Because New Jersey adopted the revised
Article 9 for secured transactions, the court refers to the revised UCC itself, rather than the specific
New Jersey code sections. See Jersey Tractor Trailer, 580 F.3d at 149 n.2. In this Note, all

references to the revised UCC are to the version found inthe South Carolina Code.
193. See Jersey Tractor Trailer, 580 F.3d at 150-51; see also § 36-1-201(37) ("The term

[security interest] also includes any interest of a buyer of accounts ... .
194. Jersey Tractor Trailer, 580 F.3d at 150.

195. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2010

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

61: 753

Under Article 9's residual priority rule, Wawel's security interest in the
accounts had priority because the bank was the first secured party to perfect its
interest. 96 However, Yale argued that, as a holder in due course or a good faith
purchaser of an instrument for value, its security interest in JTTT's accounts had
priority. 197 Unless Yale established that it was a holder in due course or a good
faith purchaser for value of the accounts, Wawel's priority in the accounts would
extend to the checks as well. 198 Consequently, the central issue facing the Third
Circuit was whether Yale acted in good faith. 199
In determining whether Yale was a holder in due course, the Third Circuit
200
applied the definition of good faith applicable to negotiable instruments.
Because the parties did not dispute that Yale acted in subjective good faith, the
critical issue became whether Yale's conduct comported with "'reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing."' 20 1 Applying Maine Family's two-step
analysis of the objective standard of good faith, 2 2 the court held that industry
standards applicable to the transaction required Yale to conduct "a commercially
reasonable lien search," which required "'using the filing office's standard
search logic. '203 Moreover, the court determined that "[r]easonable commercial
standards of fair dealing doubtlessly require a lien searcher to 'examine the
results of a proper search with reasonable diligence,' and a complete absence of
secured debt may be an indication that the lien search was improperly
conducted., 20 4 Although the court asserted that "a wiser course" of action may
have been for Yale to make further inquiries under the circumstances, it held that
Yale's failure to do so, without more, was insufficient
to find Yale did not meet
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. '20 5
The principal impact of Jersey Tractor Trailer on the liability of a
depositary bank in a counterfeit cashier's check scheme is the court's recognition
that circumstances may require a party to take extraordinary actions to meet the
objective standard of good faith.20 For example, Article 9 notes that "[a]lthough

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
definition

See id.at 149.
See id.at 155-56.
See id.at 149.
Id.at 156.
Id.at 157 n.17; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-102(b) (2003) (stating that the Article 3
of holder in due course, found in § 36-3-302, applies to Article 9);id.§ 36-9-330 official

cmt. 7 ("[T]o collect and retain checks that are proceeds (collections) of accounts free of a senior
secured party's claim to the same checks, a junior secured party must satisfy the good-faith
requirement (honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing)
of this subsection. This is the same good-faith requirement applicable to holders in due course.").
201. Jersey Tractor Trailer, 580 F.3d at 156.

202. Id.at 157 (quoting Me. Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 727
A.2d 335, 343 (Me. 1999)).

203. Id.at 158 (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (2005)).
204. Id.at 159 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc., 305 B.R.
347, 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003)).
205. Id.
206. See id.at 158-59.
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'good faith' does not impose a general duty of inquiry, . . . there may be
circumstances in which 'reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"'
require a person taking an instrument to conduct a search for senior liens.
Jersey Tractor Trailer accepts the example of such circumstances that Article 9
sets forth02 8: because a factor is aware that a debtor may have granted a prior
security interest in its accounts, the factor must conduct a commercially
reasonable search to satisfy the objective good faith standard and take free of the
senior secured party's claim as a holder in due course.20 9 Moreover, the court
suggested that under the objective standard of good faith, the scope of a factor's
search varies with the extent of its notice of the risk of senior claims. 210 In
essence, Jersey Tractor Trailer supports the argument that under the objective
standard of good faith, if a person knows or should know that his handling of an
instrument may result in a loss to another party, then he must take commercially
reasonable steps to prevent the loss. Under this interpretation of commercially
reasonable standards of fair dealing, if a depositary bank has notice that its
customer may be the target of a counterfeit cashier's scheme, then it would act in
bad faith if it permits the customer to withdraw funds prior to receiving final
settlement. Moreover, even if the customer's deposit of a large cashier's check
would not raise a "red flag" with the depositary bank, the customer's request to
immediately wire the check proceeds offshore should put the bank on notice of
the risk of fraud.
2.

Good Faith in South Carolina

In South Carolina, the two leading prerevision interpretations of the good
faith standard are First Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n of South Carolina v.
Chrysler Credit Corp.2 12 and Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C. W. Haynes & Co. 211 In
Chrysler Credit Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
explained that "good faith and notice of a defense go hand in hand. Although the
good-faith requirement only relates to defenses to the payment of a check in
question, those defenses are not limited to defenses inherent against the check
itself. '214 Consequently, a party acts in bad faith when it has notice of "defenses
with respect to the underlying attendant transaction., 215 Moreover, "the general
standard [is] that lack of good faith is shown on actual notice or on knowledge of

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-331 official cmt. 5 (2003).
See Jersey Tractor Trailer,580 F.3d at 156.
See § 36-9-331 official cmt. 5.
See Jersey Tractor Trailer,580 F.3d at 159.
See id. at 156-59.
981 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1992).
893 F. Supp. 1304 (D.S.C. 1994).
Chrysler Credit Corp., 981 F.2d at 132.
Id.
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facts and circumstances that give rise to a defense or claim." 2 16 Thus, if a bank
has actual notice of a claim or defense to the transaction underlying a negotiable
217
instrument, then the bank acts in bad faith if it does not act upon that notice.
Although a bank's notice of underlying claims or defenses may amount to
subjective bad faith, a bank's negligence does not necessarily result in the same
conclusion. 218 In Midfirst Bank, the court stated, "The fact that every policy was
not strictly complied with does not seem to bear on [the bank's] notice of the
claims" to the instruments at issue. 219 Moreover, "[e]ven 'negligence has no
reflection on the good faith requirement ... absent such outrageous conduct as
would reflect on the issue of honesty."' 220 Consequently, a bank acts with
subjective good faith even when it fails to observe strictly its internal procedures,
unless the failure is so significant it calls into question the banks honesty.22 1
Thus, if a bank violates its policy requiring an officer's approval before taking
certain actions with respect to specific types of instruments, then the violation
alone does not establish that the bank acted with subjective bad faith.222
South Carolina's revision to the UCC expressly states that the addition of the
objective prong to the good faith requirement "does not affect the validity of'
Midfirst Bank's conclusion that negligence does not establish bad faith.223
However, it is arguable that the objective component expands the definition 224
of
"outrageous conduct [that] would reflect on the issue of honesty."
Specifically, if the bank violates its internal policy with respect to handling a
cashier's check, then it has acted negligently, which would not independently
establish bad faith.225 However, if the policy the bank violates is commercially
reasonable for similarly situated banks and the policy promotes fair dealing, then
the bank may have failed the objective standard and acted in bad faith.226
Consequently, the adoption of the objective good faith standard suggests that a
bank acts in bad faith when its negligent conduct calls into question the issue of

216. Id. (citing Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Constitutes Taking Instrument in Good
Faith, and Without Notice of Infirmities or Defenses, to Support Holder-In-Due-CourseStatus,
Under UCC§ 3-302, 36 A.L.R. 4th 212, 218 (1985)).
217. See id. at 132-33.
218. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-302 reporter's cmt. (Supp. 2009) ("[P]roof of negligence does

not establish a lack of good faith.").
219. Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 1316 (D.S.C. 1994).
220. Id. (quoting Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Hardi-Gardens Supply of Ill., Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 930, 941 (M.D. Tenn. 1974)).
221. See id.
222. Id. (citing Indus. Nat'l Bank of R.I. v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc., 291 N.E.2d 603, 606

(Mass. 1973)).
223. § 36-3-302 reporter's cmt.
224. Midfirst Bank, 893 F. Supp. at 1316 (quoting Hardi-GardensSupply, 380 F. Supp. at

941) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See id.
226. See Me. Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 727 A.2d 335, 343

(Me. 1999).
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fair dealing in addition
to its more "outrageous conduct [that] reflect[s] on the
227
issue of honesty.,
As applied to Allen's quandary, he may have a viable bad faith defense to
First Depositary's claims. Like the credit union's internal policy in Maine
Family,228 First Depositary's procedure authorized lower level employees to
determine whether to make funds available for deposited instruments. Moreover,
the only framework guiding the teller's determination is his subjective suspicion
of the customer rather than an express framework of rules. Consequently, a jury
could find that First Depositary's availability policy was not reasonably
calculated to promote fair dealing, and thus, it did not satisfy the objective good
faith requirement.229
Although the absence of strict compliance with its internal policy may not
show subjective bad faith,230 First Depositary's receipt of multiple warnings
concerning counterfeit cashier's check schemes may support a finding of bad
faith. 231 These warnings put First Depositary on notice that counterfeit cashier's
check schemes often involve a bank customer depositing a nonlocal check and
wiring a portion of the proceeds overseas. 232 Moreover, this notice is coupled
with the bank's actual knowledge that Allen intended to execute a funds transfer
sending the majority of the cashier's check funds to RCI's account in Belgium.
Consequently, Allen may be able to show that First Depositary had "actual
notice or ...knowledge of facts and circumstances that give rise to a defense or
claim" on the cashier's check.233 Upon such a showing, First Depositary's
making the provisional credit immediately available for withdrawal would
constitute an act of bad faith. Thus, First Depositary's liability for breaching the
duty of good faith would at least offset Allen's liability to the bank.234

227. Midfirst Bank, 893 F. Supp. at 1316 (quoting Hardi-GardensSupply, 380 F. Supp. at
941) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Me. Family, 727 A.2d at 344.
229. Id.
230. See MidfirstBank, 893 F. Supp. at 1316.
231. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of S.C. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 981 F.2d 127, 132
(4th Cir. 1992) (citing Nadel, supranote 216, at 218).
232. See FDIC REPORT, supra note 1; OCC BULL. No. 2007-2, supranote 3.
233. Chrysler Credit Corp., 981 F.2d at 132 (citing Nadel, supra note 216, at 218).
234. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(e) (Supp. 2009).
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D. Negligent Misrepresentation and Equitable Estoppel Offsetting
Customer UCC Liability
1. Scope of the UCC 's Preemption of Common Law and Equity

Although Allen's recourse under the UCC is likely confined to claiming
First Depositary acted in bad faith,235 the common law and equity may provide a
counterclaim or defense to offset his liability to the bank. Specifically, the
teller and manager of First Depositary's communications with Allen and Lucy
may support either a negligent misrepresentation claim or an equitable estoppel
defense. However, raising a common law claim arising from transactions or
occurrences that the UCC substantially governs is difficult. 237 In particular,
before proving the merits of a negligence cause of action or an estoppel defense,
Allen must show that the UCC does not preempt these claims or defenses.238
The UCC expressly states its provisions do not specifically displace all
claims and defenses found in the common law or equity:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. 239
As the Georgia Court of Appeals stated, "'[t]he UCC does not purport to
preempt the entire body of law affecting the rights and obligations of parties to a
commercial transaction.' ' 240 Moreover, "'the UCC does not displace the
common law of tort as it affects parties in their commercial dealings except
insofar as reliance on the common law would thwart the purposes of the
Code."', 241 Consequently, Allen's negligence claim or equitable estoppel defense
242
is viable unless a specific statutory provision displaces the common law.
South Carolina courts have determined that "[d]isplacement occurs when one or

235. See id. (limiting damages for negligence in the handling of an item to "the amount of the
item reduced by an amount that could not have been realized by the exercise of ordinary care" but
allowing other damages "suffered as a proximate consequence" if the bank acted in bad faith).
236. See Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 191-92 (Mont. 2006); Marsh, supra
note 7, at 434.

237. See Marsh, supra note 7, at 434 ("There is a tension between the application of [common
law] theories and the loss allocation rules established in... the Uniform Commercial Code.").
238. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Okey, 812 F.2d 906, 908-09 (4th

Cir. 1987) (applying South Carolina law in considering whether the UCC conversion statute
displaced a common law negligence claim for paying on a forged indorsement).
239. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (2003).
240. First Ga. Bank v. Webster, 308 S.E.2d 579, 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting N.J. Bank,

N.A. v. Bradford Sec. Operations, Inc., 690 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1982)).
241. See id.(quoting BradfordSec., 690 F.2d at 346).
242. See Okey, 812 F.2d at 909.
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more particular provisions of the U.C.C. comprehensively address a particular
subject. '243 Thus, the facts supporting Allen's negligence claim or equitable
defense must fall outside of situations the UCC specifically governs.
2.

244
OvercomingPreemption: Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes

Although the issue of whether a bank employee's statements to a bank
customer regarding a deposited instrument can give rise to a negligent
misrepresentation claim that the UCC does not displace is novel in South
Carolina, other jurisdictions have considered the issue. In Valley Bank of Ronan
v. Hughes, the Montana Supreme Court held that common law and equitable
principles govern a bank's communications to its customer about the check
collections process "[b]ecause
such communications are not addressed with
245
specificity by the UCC.
a. Facts of Valley Bank of Ronan
Valley Bank of Ronan involved a bank customer, Hughes, who "was conned
by a 'Nigerian scam"' that requested "his aid in procuring agricultural equipment
for import into Africa." 246 In exchange
for his assistance, Hughes was promised
247
a multimillion dollar commission. Among the bogus instruments the swindlers
248
sent him, Hughes received two official checks. Prior to depositing the official
checks, Hughes had a bank employee,249who was both an officer and a teller,
verify the validity of the instruments.
She told Hughes that official checks
were the "'same as cash"' and that he could "'do whatever [he] want[ed] to do
[with them]."' 250 Moreover, she "assured Hughes that official checks were 'just
like' cashier's checks." 251 After wiring the funds to the swindler's accounts, the
counterfeit instruments were returned dishonored and the bank charged back
Hughes's account, resulting in the account being overdrawn. 252 To satisfy the
overdraft, Hughes deposited all of his retirement savings into the overdrawn
253
account, and he executed a promissory note secured by mortgaged property.

243. Hitachi Elec. Devices (USA), Inc. v. Platinum Techs., Inc., 366 S.C. 163, 170, 621
S.E.2d 38, 41 (2005) (citing Flavor-Inn, Inc. v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of S.C., 309 S.C. 508, 511, 424
S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ct. App. 1992)); accord Okey, 812 F.2d at 908-11 (explaining UCC conversion
statute's comprehensive coverage displaced a negligence claim under South Carolina common law
for paying a forged indorsement).
244. 147 P.3d 185 (Mont. 2006).
245. Id. at 191.
246. Id. at 188.
247. Id.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189.
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After Hughes failed to make payments on the note, Valley Bank of Ronan
commenced foreclosure proceedings.2 54 In response, Hughes raised multiple
counterclaims, including a negligent misrepresentation claim arising from his
conversation with the bank employee prior to depositing the counterfeit
instruments.2 55 The trial court granted Valley Bank of Ronan's motion for
summary judgment on Hughes's negligent misrepresentation
~257 claim.256 Basing its
of UCC section 1-103,
version
conclusion on its interpretation of Montana's
as well as Chase v. Morgan Guarantee Trust Co.,258 Allen v. Carver Federal
259
Savings and Loan Ass 'n,
and Call v. Ellenville National Bank260 (collectively

"the New York cases"), the trial court determined that on the facts
261presented,
"the UCC preempt[ed] Hughes' equitable and common law claims."
b.

UCC 's Definition of "Ordinary Care" and Other
Jurisdictions That Support Negligent Misrepresentation
and Equitable Estoppel Claims

In reversing the trial court's finding of statutory preemption, the Montana
Supreme
Court focused on whether Valley Bank of Ronan exercised ordinary
262
care. In doing so, the court determined that the UCC duty of ordinary care
applied to some bank activities while common law duties were applicable to
other bank activities. 263 Relying on the second sentence of the UCC's definition
of ordinary care, 264 the court held that the UCC preempts common law claims
relating to a bank's processing of checks. 265 However, the court also held that the
UCC does not preempt common law claims arising from a bank's
communications to its customer while it is processing checks.266 Thus, "common
law and equitable principles ... govern the legal rights and responsibilities that

254. Id.
255. Id.

256. Id.
257. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-103 (2009). This statute is nearly identical to South Carolina's
version of UCC section 1-103. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (2003).
258.
259.
260.
261.

590 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
477 N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Term 1984).
774 N.Y.S.2d 76 (App. Div. 2004).
Valley Bank ofRonan, 147 P.3d at 190.

262. Id. at 191.
263. Id. at 191-92.
264. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-3-102(g) (2009) ("In the case of a bank that takes an instrument
for processing for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercial standards do
not require the bank to examine the instrument if the failure to examine does not violate the bank's
prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking
usage not disapproved by this chapter or chapter 4."). This statute is the same, in substance, as
South Carolina's UCC definition of ordinary care. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103(a)(9) (Supp.
2009).
265. Valley Bank ofRonan, 147 P.3d at 191.
266. Id.
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apply to [the bank's] representations to [its customer], upon which [the
customer] allegedly relied.
In addition to finding that the trial court erred in applying the UCC's duty of
ordinary care,268 the Montana Supreme Court also came to a different
understanding of the New York cases that the trial court relied on in support of
preemption. 26 9 Although the court acknowledged that the New York cases were
decided against the party making common law claims, it found they supported a
"determination that common law principles apply to bank communications to a
depositor inquiring about the processing of checks., 270 The Valley Bank of
Ronan court found the following passage from the Chase opinion particularly
enlightening:
[B]anks have nothing to gain by misleading customers into believing
that uncleared items have cleared. Indeed, banks are usually overly
cautious in giving provisional credit precisely because of the uncertainty
of uncollected items. A bank could be liable for a misstatement in these
general circumstances if the misstatement were part of a scheme to
defraud a customer in Chase's position by, for example, a conspiracy
between the bank and the party to whom Chase transferred the funds.
This of course is merely one example. As discussed supra, however, [the
UCC charge-back provision] simply does not hold liable for chargeback a bank whose employee inadvertently in some remark misleads a
customer as to the precise likelihood that an item will clear.
The outcome might be different if a bank expressly informed a
customer that it had made a final settlement on the account, but that is
not the case here.271
Moreover, it found the Allen court also indicated a bank could be liable for
negligent misrepresentations from its employees to customers about check
processing information:
We are dubious that the mere statement of a depositor that an
unidentified teller told her (mistakenly) that a check had "cleared",
when in fact it had not, constitutes that quantum of proof of negligence

267. Id.
268. Id. at 191-92.
269. See id. at 192-93.
270. Id.at 192.
271. Id.(first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chase v. Morgan Guarantee
Trust Co., 590 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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which will enable a customer to prevail against the bank under the
circumstances disclosed here.272
Finally, after thoroughly noting its opposition to the Call court's
interpretation that the term "cleared" does not mean "final settlement, '2 73 the
Montana Supreme Court found that Call's language "left open the possibility
that a bank's misrepresentation of2 7the
status of the check settlement process
4
could lead to liability for the bank.,
From the New York cases, the Montana Supreme Court determined that a
bank could satisfy the UCC but still be liable under the principles of common
law and equity:
In each of the above cases, the defendant bank was granted
summary judgment because the plaintiff depositor failed to allege facts
sufficient to impute liability to the bank. However, though the bank
prevailed in each case, the analyses do not support the proposition that
common law and equitable principles have been preempted by the UCC.
Instead, they intimate that, in certain circumstances, common law and
equitable principles may supplement the UCC where the bank-though
not violating its UCC-defined duty of ordinary care with respect to
processing checks-breaches a duty to its275depositor by misrepresenting
the status of the check settlement process.

Consequently, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of Hughes's negligent misrepresentation claim.276 Moreover, it held
"while Hughes bore the obligation to repay Valley Bank to satisfy the bank's
right of charge-back . . .

,

it nevertheless is possible for Hughes to obtain a

277
judgment to compensate him for the charge-back debt.,

3.

Comparison of ERISA's Preemption of State Law Claims to the
UCC's Preemptionof Common Law and Equity

The Montana Supreme Court viewed Hughes's negligence claim as
encompassing two different activities: "a claim made by Hughes directed toward
the UCC-defined standard of ordinary care with respect to check processing
(focusing purely on process), and the alleged representations made by bank

272. Id. (quoting Allen v. Carver Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 477 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (App. Term

1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
273. Id. at 193 & n.6 (quoting Call v. Ellenville Nat'l Bank, 774 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79 (App. Div.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
274. Id. at 193.
275. Id. (emphasis added).

276. Id.
277. Id. at 192.
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personnel regarding the check settlement process." 278 Although South Carolina
has yet to adopt this multiple activities view in the context of UCC preemption
of common law claims, it has done so with regards to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act's 279 (ERISA) federal preemption of state law causes of
action.28 °
Like UCC section 1-103, 2 11 ERISA explicitly states its preemptive nature:
"[T]he provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan .... 2 8 2 Under the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of ERISA's preemptive language, "the phrase 'relate to' should be
given its broad, common-sense meaning such that a state law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan ... if it has a 'connection with or reference to' such a
plan. '' 283 Despite the "conspicuous . . . breadth" of ERISA's preemptive
language, 4 South Carolina courts have found state negligence claims do not
"relate to" an employee benefits plan when those claims arise from
misrepresentations concerning the terms of a plan
or incompetent advice offered
285
in connection to the administration of the plan.
As compared to the ERISA preemptive language, the UCC preemption
provision has a narrow scope. The plain language of the ERISA statute creates
the presumption of federal preemption of state law claims concerning employee
benefit plans.286 In contrast, common law and equitable principles govern
commercial transactions "[u]nless displacedby [a] particularprovision[]" of the
287
UCC.
Consequently, ERISA preempts all state law claims arising from
activities that have "a 'connection with or reference to"' an employee benefits
288
plan,
the that
UCCit comprehensively
merely displacesaddresses.
common289law and equitable claims
based onwhile
activities

278. Marsh, supra note 7, at 431 (citing Valley Bank ofRonan, 147 P.3d at 191).
279. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
280. See Med. Park OB/GYN, P.A. v. Ragin, 321 S.C. 139, 143-46, 467 S.E.2d 261, 263-65
(Ct. App. 1996).
281. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (2003).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
283. Ragin, 321 S.C. at 143-44, 467 S.E.2d at 264 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987)).
284. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
285. Ragin, 321 S.C. at 145, 467 S.E.2d at 264-65; Heaitley v. Brittingham, Dial & Jeffcoat,
320 S.C. 466, 469-70, 465 S.E.2d 763, 765 (Ct. App. 1995).
286. See Ragin, 321 S.C. at 143, 467 S.E.2d at 263 ("Without question, Congress has
expressed its intent to occupy the field of employee benefit plans to the exclusion of the states.").
287. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (2003) (emphasis added).
288. Ragin, 321 S.C. at 143-44, 467 S.E.2d at 264 (quoting PilotLife Ins., 481 U.S. at 47).
289. See Hitachi Elec. Devices (USA), Inc. v. Platinum Techs., Inc., 366 S.C. 163, 170, 621
S.E.2d 38, 41 (2005) (citing Flavor-Inn, Inc. v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of S.C., 309 S.C. 508, 511, 424
S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ct. App. 1992)); see also Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Okey, 812
F.2d 906, 908-11 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that UCC conversion statute displaced negligence claim
under South Carolina common law for paying a forged indorsement).
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Accordingly, South Carolina's interpretation that ERISA does not bar state
law negligence claims concerning employee benefits plans strongly supports a
similar finding that the UCC does not displace Allen's common law and
equitable claims. Specifically, a misrepresentation made during the creation of
an employee benefits plan can serve as the basis for a negligence claim despite
its logical relationship to the plan.290 Similarly, the bank's misrepresentations to
Allen occurred during the creation of a comprehensively covered UCC topicthe check collections process. Moreover, like a plan administrator's state law
claim that does not challenge its federally defined responsibilities, 291 Allen's
negligent misrepresentation claim does not challenge his or the bank's statutory
liability. Rather, his claim merely seeks to make First Depositary liable for its
employees' false and misleading statements, which no UCC provision
specifically addresses. Therefore, in light of other jurisdictions' allowance for
negligent misrepresentation claims on similar facts and South Carolina's
interpretation of ERISA's preemption provision, a South Carolina court should
not bar his common law claims and equitable defenses due to UCC
displacement.
4.

Negligent Misrepresentation and Equitable Estoppel in South
Carolina

In these circumstances, the most likely common law cause of action will be
the bank customer's negligent misrepresentation claim against the depositary
bank based upon the communications surrounding the deposit and funds
transfer. 292 Moreover, some courts have allowed customers to assert an estoppel
defense to offset their liability to the bank.293 In South Carolina, for a customer's
negligent misrepresentation claim to succeed, he must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the following six elements:

290. Ragin, 321 S.C. at 145-46, 467 S.E.2d at 265 ("Indeed, the claims relate to advice given
prior to the implementation of the Plan.").
291. Id. at 146, 467 S.E.2d at 265.
292. See Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 191-92 (Mont. 2006) (recognizing

possible negligent misrepresentation claim arising from bank employee's communications to
customer concerning deposited official check).
293. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Ulibarri, 557 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Colo. App. 1976)
(estopping bank from asserting indorser's liability claim when bank employee misrepresented to
customer that check was finally settled); First Ga. Bank v. Webster, 308 S.E.2d 579, 582 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that bank was estopped from
asserting refund and indorser's liability claims when customer detrimentally relied on bank
employee's statement that deposited check was "good"); Burke v. First Peoples Bank of N.J., 412
A.2d 1089, 1090-93 (N.J. Cumberland County Ct. 1980) (considering whether depositary bank was
estopped from asserting warranty claims and its right to charge back when bank employee
misrepresented facts within the bank's knowledge and holding that factual issues precluded granting
summary judgment in bank's favor).
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(1) the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) the
defendant had a pecuniary interest in making the statement, (3) the
defendant owed a duty of care to see that he communicated truthful
information to the plaintiff, (4) the defendant breached that duty by
failing to exercise due care, (5) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the
representation, and (6) the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary
loss as the
294
proximate result of his reliance on the representation.
Likewise, South Carolina courts also require a party to establish six elements
for a successful equitable estoppel defense:
The essential elements of estoppel as related to the party estopped are:
(1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of
material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression
that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the
party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least
expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party;
[and] (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As related
to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are: (1) lack of
knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in
question, (2) reliance upon the
conduct of the party estopped, and (3)
295
prejudicial change in position.
Comparing the two, both require the claimant to show essentially the same
facts: the defendant made a false representation to the claimant; the defendant
knew or should have known the actual facts and that the claimant would rely on
his representation of the facts; the claimant's reliance on the defendant's
representation was justified; and the claimant's reliance was to his detriment.
To establish that the defendant made a false representation to the claimant,
the defendant's statement "must relate to a present or pre-existing fact and be
false when made,"296 rather than being a "mere statement of opinion. 297 The
teller's and branch manager's statements to Lucy and Allen that cashier's checks
could be treated "just like cash" are statements of preexisting fact rather than
opinion. The plethora of warnings concerning cashier's check fraud schemes the
bank received and the customers' misplaced reliance on cashier's check

294. Turner v. Milliman, 381 S.C. 101, 112-13, 671 S.E.2d 636, 642 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
McLaughlin v. Williams, 379 S.C. 451, 456, 665 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Ct. App. 2008)).
295. Frazier v. Smallseed, 384 S.C. 56, 65-66, 682 S.E.2d 8, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting S. Dev. Land & Golf Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 311 S.C. 29, 33, 426 S.E.2d
748, 750 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
296. Spires v. Acceleration Nat'l Ins. Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 750, 755 (D.S.C. 2006) (citing
AMA Mgmt. Corp. v. Strasburger, 309 S.C. 213, 222, 420 S.E.2d 868, 874 (Ct. App. 1992)).
297. AMA Mgmt. Corp., 309 S.C. at 222, 420 S.E.2d at 874 (citing Winburn v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 287 S.C. 435, 339 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1985)).
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concretely establish that cashier's checks are not cash.298 Consequently, First
Depositary's employees' comparison of cashier's checks to cash was a false
representation relating to an actual fact.
Proving the knowledge requirement can be done in two ways. For the
negligent misrepresentation claim, this requirement is established if "the
defendant ha[s] a pecuniary interest in making the statement" and a duty to
provide truthful information to the claimant.299 In South Carolina, a party is
deemed to have a pecuniary interest in a statement if "the statement was made in
the course of the [party's] business, profession, or employment., 300 This rule
applies even if the party did not receive consideration for making the
statement. 301 Moreover, a party with a pecuniary interest in a transaction has the
duty to exercise reasonable care when giving information relating to the
transaction. 302 A party may breach this duty if it fails to ascertain the financial
3 3
conditions surrounding the underlying obligations of the transaction. 0
Similarly, a showing of the defendant's pecuniary interest and his duty to
communicate truthfully may support an equitable estoppel defense. 30 4 Indeed,
under the test for equitable estoppel, the defendant need not have actual
knowledge of the facts or a duty to communicate truthfully. 30 5 Rather, the
defendant must merely have constructive knowledge of the
30 6 truth and an
expectation that the plaintiff will rely on the misrepresentation.
Here, the bank employees' misrepresentations to Allen and Lucy occurred
during the deposit of the cashier's check and the execution of the funds transfer,
which are clearly parts of First Depositary's normal course of business. As such,
First Depositary had a pecuniary interest in making these statements, which
obligated the bank to exercise reasonable care when giving information related to
the transactions. Consequently, even if the bank employees did not have actual
knowledge of the liabilities and nature of cashier's checks, they failed to exercise

298. See FDIC REPORT, supra note 1 ("The growth in financial fraud is troubling. Of
particular concern is the significant increase in the number of counterfeit cashier's and official
checks ....");OCC BULL. No. 2007-2, supra note 3 (describing cashier's checks as vehicles for

fraud).
299. See Turner, 381 S.C. at 112, 671 S.E.2d at 642 (quoting McLaughlin, 379 S.C. at 456,
665 S.E.2d at 670) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300. AMA Mgmt. Corp., 309 S.C. at 223, 420 S.E.2d at 874 (citing Winburn, 287 S.C. at 442,
339 S.E.2d at 146-47).
301. Id. (citing Winburn, 287 S.C. at 442, 339 S.E.2d at 146-47).
302. Osborn v. Univ. Med. Assocs. of the Med. Univ. of S.C., 278 F. Supp. 2d 720, 735
(D.S.C. 2003) (citing Winburn, 287 S.C. at 441, 339 S.E.2d at 146).
303. See id.
304. See S. Dev. Land & Golf Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 311 S.C. 29, 33, 426 S.E.2d 748,
751 (1993) ("Estoppel by silence arises where a person owing another a duty to speak refrains from
doing so and thereby leads the other to believe in the existence of an erroneous state of facts."
(citing Ridgill v. Clarendon County, 192 S.C. 321, 326, 6 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1939))).
305. See Frazier v. Smallseed, 384 S.C. 56, 65, 682 S.E.2d 8, 13 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing S.
Dev. Land & Golf,311 S.C. at 33, 426 S.E.2d at 750).
306. Id.
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reasonable care because they should have known that cashier's checks were not
cash equivalents. Allen can probably prove the reliance requirement as well.
First Depositary's employees expected Allen to act on their misrepresentations
because he and Lucy both stated to the bank's employees that the purpose of the
communications was to determine when Allen could wire the funds to RCI.
Thus, Allen can likely establish that First Depositary knew the true facts with
respect to its false statement and that it expected Allen to rely on that
misrepresentation, which would support both a negligent misrepresentation
claim and an equitable estoppel defense.
Although Allen may likely show that First Depositary knew or should have
known that it communicated false information to him and that he relied on it, it
may be difficult for Allen to prove that his reliance was justified. Determining
whether a party justifiably relied on a representation "involves the evaluation of
the totality of the circumstances." 30 7 In this determination, South Carolina courts
examine the parties' relative positions and relations. 30 8 Thus, a plaintiffs
reliance is justifiable "'only if the relationship of the parties is such that the
defendant occupies a superior position to the plaintiff with respect to knowledge
of the truth of the statement made."' 309 Consequently, a party cannot justifiably
310
rely on a representation he actually knows is false.
Moreover, reliance is
unjustified if a party "'could ascertain [the truth] on his own in the exercise of
due diligence." 1
Here, Allen's profession may prevent him from showing that he justifiably
relied on First Depositary's misrepresentations. As an attorney, Allen is ethically
obligated to represent his clients competently, which requires him to have legal
knowledge pertaining to the matter at issue.1 12 Consequently, his representation
of Legitimate most likely required him to ascertain the potential
risks attributable
313
to cashier's checks and wiring their proceeds overseas. Thus, even though no
attorney-client relationship may have formed between Allen and RCI giving rise
to an ethical obligation,31 Allen likely violated this obligation when he did not

307. West v. Gladney, 341 S.C. 127, 134, 533 S.E.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Elders
v. Parker, 286 S.C. 228, 233, 332 S.E.2d 563, 567 (Ct. App. 1985)).
308. Id. (quoting Elders, 286 S.C. at 233, 332 S.E.2d at 567).
309. Hit Prods. Corp. v. Anchor Fin. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (D.S.C. 1999) (quoting
Harrington v. Mikell, 321 S.C. 518, 522, 469 S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ct. App. 1996)), aff'd, 215 F.3d
1318 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
310. Id. (citing Harrington,321 S.C. at 522, 469 S.E.2d at 629) ("Reliance is not reasonable if
the plaintiff knows the truth of the matter misrepresented.").
311. West, 341 S.C. at 134, 533 S.E.2d at 337 (quoting AMA Mgmt. Corp. v. Strasburger, 309
S.C. 213, 223, 420 S.E.2d 868, 874 (Ct. App. 1992)).
312. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 1.1.
313. Id. cmt. 5 ("Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis
of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the
standards of competent practitioners.").
314. It is arguable that no attorney-client relationship arose between Allen and RCI because it
is unlikely that RCI actually expected Allen to provide any actual legal representation or sought
legal advice from him. See Marshall v. Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 539, 320 S.E.2d 44, 47 (Ct. App.
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315
fully discover the risks associated with his representation of Legitimate.
Although violations of ethical rules normally do not "give rise to a cause of
action against a lawyer nor should [they] create any presumption in such a case
that a legal duty has been breached,, 316 whether Allen exercised due diligence is
an issue of his conduct rather than an issue of whether First Depositary has a
claim against him or whether he had a legal duty. Consequently, his failure to
ascertain the true legal character of cashier's checks may be used as evidence
that he failed to exercise due diligence. 317 Therefore, Allen's reliance on First
Depositary's misrepresentations may have been unjustified, which would be fatal
318
to his negligent misrepresentation claim and his equitable estoppel defense.
Although Allen's non-UCC claims may fail because of the professional standard
for competent representation, the typical bank customer's non-UCC claims will
not have to overcome this hurdle.

VI. ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM A NIGERIAN SCHEME
A.

Application of South CarolinaRule 1.15( )

In addition to possibly facing civil liability to First Depositary, Allen may
face serious disciplinary sanctions for the charge back against his trust account.
South Carolina's ethics rule concerning safekeeping of client's property permits
attorneys to disburse funds from an account containing multiple clients' funds
only if "the funds to be disbursed have been deposited [into their trust] account
and are collected funds., 3 19 However, the definition of "collected funds" in the
ethics context differs from the UCC concept of receipt of final settlement.320 In
the ethics arena, collected funds encompass not only funds that have been finally
settled, but also the following items, which constitute "collected funds
equivalents":
deposits treated by the depository institution as equivalent to cash,
properly endorsed government checks, certified checks, cashiers checks
or other checks drawn by a depository institution, and any other
instrument payable at or through a depository institution, if the amount

1984) ("A person attains the status of a 'client' when that person seeks legal advice by
communicating in confidence with an attorney for the purpose of obtaining such advice." (citing In
re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. 828, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1978))). Instead, RCI sought
only to defraud Allen.
315. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 1.1.
316. Id. Scope 7.
317. See id. ("[S]ince the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's
violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.").
318. See supranotes 294-95 and accompanying text.
319. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 1.15(f).
320. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4-215 (Supp. 2009) (establishing UCC's concept of final
settlement).
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of such other instrument does not exceed $5,000 and the lawyer has
reasonable and prudent belief
that the deposit of such other instrument
321
will be collected promptly.
Moreover, because personal checks are the only items restricted to a $5,000
maximum amount, all the other listed instruments, including cashier's checks,
are collected funds equivalents unrestricted in amount.322 In addition, an attorney
disbursing unrestricted collected funds equivalents need not have a reasonable
belief that the unrestricted collected funds equivalents will in fact be collected.323
If an attorney disburses any collected funds equivalent and no actual collection
occurs, then the attorney must deposit replacement funds within five working
days of the notice of noncollection.
As applied to Allen's predicament, South Carolina's ethics rules require
Allen to deposit $8,820,000 into the trust account within five business days of
learning Degrelle's cashier's check was dishonored. Although some South
Carolina lawyers may have this much cash at their personal disposal, it would be
fair to assume that Allen and the average South Carolina attorney does not.
Consequently, like the defendant in Valley Bank of Ronan, Allen most likely will
have to deposit his personal savings into the trust account and issue a promissory
note to First Depositary secured by Allen's property for the remainder of the
325
overdraft.
However, due to the size of the debt, it is also possible that First
Depositary may view a promissory note as too risky or that Allen simply does
not have enough unencumbered property to secure such a note. Assuming that
Allen and First Depositary do not reach a settlement agreement within five
business days, Allen has violated his ethical obligation to safeguard his client's
property.326
As a result, on the sixth day after receiving notice that Degrelle's cashier's
check was dishonored, Allen will violate the South Carolina Rules of
Professional Conduct because he has not replaced the uncollected funds in his
trust account. 327 Even though Allen will be subject to discipline, 328 he should

321. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, R. 1.15(f).
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. Id.
325. See Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 189 (Mont. 2006).
326. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 1.15(f).
327. See id.
328. Id. R. 413, R. 7(a)(1). The South Carolina Supreme Court "'has made it abundantly clear
that an attorney is charged with a special responsibility in maintaining and preserving the integrity
of trust funds."' In re Houston, 382 S.C. 164, 167, 675 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2009) (per curiam)
(quoting In re Padgett, 290 S.C. 209, 211, 349 S.E.2d 338, 338 (1986) (per curiam)). Because
Allen's misconduct involved breaching this special responsibility, he could face severe sanctions,
including disbarment, suspension, or public reprimand. S.C. APP. CT. R. 413, R. 7(b). Moreover,
Allen's sanctions will likely require him to reimburse his clients who lost money as a result of his
misconduct. Id. R. 7(b)(7).
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self-report his violation. 329 Although Allen's misconduct is arguably insufficient
to warrant another lawyer at his firm reporting him,330 the disciplinary committee
eventually will learn of the violation. Specifically, if Allen's other clients do not
report him for not protecting the funds they gave him in trust, then First
Depositary will almost assuredly make note of the charge back in its IOLTA
notification to the state bar foundation.331
In addition to accepting that someone will inevitably report his violation, if
Allen self-reports this violation, it may reduce the disciplinary sanctions he will
receive. In determining the appropriate disciplinary sanctions, the South Carolina
Supreme Court views whether the attorney self-reports his violation as a
significant factor. 332 Moreover, the court has recently held that self-reporting an
ethics violation, along with cooperating with the disciplinary investigation, may
reduce the severity of the sanctions provided the attorney has no prior
violations. 333 Consequently, to avoid suspension or disbarment, Allen should not

329. Compare In re Gray, 381 S.C. 406, 414, 673 S.E.2d 442, 446 (2009) (per curiam)
(suspending attorney for nine months after noting that attorney never self-reported his misconduct),
with In re Lee, 370 S.C. 501, 503-05, 636 S.E.2d 624, 625-26 (2006) (per curiam) (suspending
attorney for 180 days after noting that attorney self-reported his violation and cooperated with the
disciplinary committee).
330. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 8.3(a). Although "[s]elf regulation of the legal profession
requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a
violation," id cmt. 1, a lawyer is not obligated to report every violation, id. cmt. 3. Rather, the
violations a lawyer must report are those that he "knows that another lawyer has committed" and
that "raise[] a substantialquestion as to [the other] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer." Id. R. 8.3(a) (emphasis added). Consequently, a lawyer's reporting obligation under this
rule is limited "to those offenses that a self regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to
prevent." Id. cmt. 3. Here, Allen's violation does not reflect on his honesty or trustworthiness. Thus,
if this violation were to trigger another lawyer's reporting obligation, then it would have to reflect
on Allen's "fitness as a lawyer." Id. R. 8.3(a). Because a "measure of judgment is ... required in"
determining whether to report, id cmt. 3, another lawyer's failure to report Allen's violation may
not give rise to a violation of the rules if the other lawyer felt in good faith that Allen's violation did
not reflect on his fitness to practice. However, as noted above, the South Carolina Supreme Court
'has made it abundantly clear that an attorney is charged with a special responsibility in
maintaining and preserving the integrity oftrust funds."' In re Houston, 382 S.C. at 167, 675 S.E.2d
at 723 (quoting In re Padgett, 290 S.C. at 211, 349 S.E.2d at 338). Consequently, the disciplinary
committee may find that Allen's violation was an "offense[] that a self regulating profession must
vigorously endeavor to prevent," S.C. ApP. CT. R. 407, R. 8.3 cmt. 3, and require lawyers who know
of Allen's violation to report it.
331. See S.C. App. CT. R. 412(h). Moreover, if any checks drawn on Allen's trust account are
dishonored for insufficient finds, then First Depositary will be obligated to report this occurrence to
the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. Id. R. 407, R. 1.15(h) (requiring attorneys to direct financial
institutions to report to ethics commission when instruments drawn on trust accounts are dishonored
for insufficient funds).
332. Compare In re Gray, 381 S.C. at 414, 673 S.E.2d at 446 (suspending attorney for nine
months who did not self-report overbilling), with In re Lee, 370 S.C. at 504-05, 636 S.E.2d at 62526 (suspending attorney for 180 days who self-reported overbilling).
333. The South Carolina Supreme Court expressed this sentiment in the following way:
The misconduct reported in this opinion would normally warrant the imposition of a
suspension from the practice of law. However, because respondent self-reported his
misconduct to [the Office of Disciplinary Counsel], fully cooperated with the disciplinary
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only self-report his violation, but also fully cooperate with the disciplinary
investigation. Furthermore, even if Allen avoids disbarment or suspension, he
will likely have to reimburse any of his clients who were financially injured as a
result of his misconduct and possibly pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceedings.33 4
B. Policy Rationale of Rule 1.15()
The genesis of South Carolina's rule allowing lawyers to disburse deposited
collected funds equivalents arose from issues surrounding real estate closings.335
Commonly, lawyers conducting real estate closings must "table fund" a portion
of the closing costs. 336 Table funding is the "practice whereby a mortgage loan is
funded at settlement by an advance of loan funds and a contemporaneous
assignment of the loan is made to the person advancing the funds. 337
In the normal table funding scenario, a "lawyer ... conducting the closing
[has] already confirmed the deposit (via verified and documented wire transfer)
of some of the funds to be disbursed while having just received (in the form of
collected fund equivalents which are not yet deposited) the balance of the funds
to be disbursed.",338 In this situation, the closing attorney is permitted to disburse
funds representing the confirmed deposit, but he may not disburse funds from his
339
trust account representing the table funds until those funds are deposited.
Consequently, the rules merely require the closing attorney to deposit table funds
that are collected funds equivalents prior to disbursing trust funds.34 ' Thus, if a
real estate attorney does not receive a verified and documented receipt of a wire
transfer for all of the funds needed to close the transaction, but he does receive a
cashier's check for the balance, then he can simply have the cashier's check
deposited into his trust account 341
on the closing date and disburse all of the
necessary funds from that account.

investigation, and has served the Bar of this State for more than thirty years with no prior

disciplinary history, we find that a public reprimand is warranted.
In re Fayssoux, 381 S.C. 637, 643, 675 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2009) (per curiam).
334. See S.C. App. CT. R. 413, R. 7(b)(7)-(8).
335. See, e.g., S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-03 (2006), available at
http://www.scbar.org/member-resources/ethics advisoryopinions/&id=631 (addressing whether a
closing attorney can table fund a "transaction to the extent [the closing attorney] has received
'collected funds' via verified and documented wire transfer or via deposit of 'cash equivalents').
336. See id.
337. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERPRETIVE LETTER No. 1002, at

2 (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/aug04/int1002.pdf.
338. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-03 (2006), available at http://www.scbar.org/

member resources/ethics advisoryopinions/&id=631.
339. Id.
340. See id. ("Rule 1.15(f) neither explicitly nor implicitly prohibits a partial table funding
provided that the funds so disbursed are collected funds that have been deposited into the account
from which the disbursements are being made.").
341. See id.
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Although Rule 1.15 benefits real estate closings, its general application to all
trust account disbursements is problematic. The forms of payment the rule lists
as unrestricted collected funds equivalents incorrectly implies cashier's and other
bank checks (i.e., teller's and certified checks) can safely be treated as collected
funds.342 Unlike the other forms of unrestricted collected funds equivalents, bank
checks are subject to dishonor or stop payment orders, which would prevent the
deposited instrument from actually being collected.343 Moreover, bank checks
are more susceptible to counterfeiting, forgeries, and alterations than the other
forms of collected funds equivalents.34 4 In comparison, there are far fewer
government agencies that issue government checks than there are banks that
issue bank checks.345 With more options to choose from, common sense suggests
that a counterfeiter armed with modem imaging technology is more likely to find
a bank check with weak security features than a similarly infirm government
check. Furthermore, although it is possible for a counterfeiter to create a fake
funds transfer, it is improbable that this could be done at the neighborhood
Kinko's like a counterfeit bank check.
Viewed in light of the potential risks associated with bank checks, they
appear more like personal checks than the other unrestricted collected funds
equivalents. However, under Rule 1.15, personal checks and bank checks are
treated differently. 346 In South Carolina, a lawyer may treat a deposited personal
check as collected funds if the check "does not exceed $5,000 and the lawyer has
reasonable and prudent belief that the deposit of such other instrument will be
collected promptly." 347 If these same requirements were applied to bank checks,
then they may help prevent a lawyer from becoming a victim to a counterfeiter's
scheme. In particular, the $5,000 limitation has the potential to reduce
significantly the negative impact those counterfeit schemes create. 348 Moreover,

342. See S.C. APP.CT.R. 407, R. 1.15(f).

343. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-411 (Supp. 2009). A funds transfer also may be reversed, but
reversal would require the attorney's bank to agree to the reversal, which seems unlikely without
first obtaining the attorney's consent. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-4A-211(c)(2) (2003). In addition,
once a check is certified, the depositor may treat the certified check as collected finds because the

payor bank is obligated to pay the check. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-409(a), (d) (Supp. 2009).
Although it is plausible that a government check may be dishonored, if a United States government
check, which is the predominant government check used in the United States, is dishonored, then
the state of the nation's economy is probably of more concern to the depositor than whether he is
facing disciplinary sanctions.
344. See OCC BULL No. 2007-2, supra note 3 (describing risks associated with cashier's and

other bank checks).
345. Assuming that each state and the federal government has fifty agencies that issue
government checks, then as of May 11, 2010, there are over 5,000 more FDIC-insured institutions
that could issue checks than government agencies. See FDIC: Institution Directory, http://www2.

fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp (last visited May 11, 2010).
346. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 1.15(f).
347. Id.
348. Many cashier's check fraud schemes involve amounts that exceed $5,000. See, e.g.,
United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2006) (describing fraudulent investing scheme
involving over $1.5 million of counterfeit cashier's checks); United States v. Himler, 355 F.3d 735,
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the South Carolina Bar's Ethics Advisory Committee's words of caution
concerning treating personal checks as collected funds are equally applicable to
bank checks:
[L]awyers should exercise great caution in accepting [personal checks]
as collected funds equivalents items ... if $5000 or less in amount. The
Committee believes that that particular collected fhnds equivalent
should be used only in rare cases to accommodate last minute changes
to closing statements or similar unforeseen circumstances and that it
should not be34treated
as an indication that amounts less than $5000 are
9
insignificant.
Thus, considering bank checks' infirmities, lawyers should treat them as
collected funds equivalents only in similar rare cases where the lawyer knows
the actual identity of the party transferring the instrument and waiting for actual
collection is infeasible.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Traditional negotiable instrument law and the UCC's loss apportionment
doctrines were formed contemplating forgeries and alterations. 350 Yet modem
advancements in commerce and imaging technology have made pure counterfeits
a common component of recent check fraud cases.151 This trend has strained the
UCC's loss apportionment rules, although not necessarily their underlying
reasoning of holding the least cost risk avoider accountable for the loss.
Despite numerous warnings to both customers and banks, these schemes
continue to find unsuspecting victims. These victims often fall for the scheme
due to their misconception that cashier's checks are the same as cash. Although
banks have more knowledge concerning the true character of cashier's checks in
comparison to the average customer, the UCC burdens the customer with the
loss from these schemes unless the bank acted in bad faith.
Even when the bank has acted in good faith, depending on the facts, the
customer may have a viable common law or equitable claim to offset his
statutory liability. Often these non-UCC causes of action arise from
communications between the bank and the customer regarding whether the
deposited cashier's check is "good." However, if the customer is an attorney,
then his ethical duty to represent his clients competently may prevent him from

737 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing fraudulent real estate purchase involving $195,000 of counterfeit
cashier's checks); Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 188 (Mont. 2006) (describing
Nigerian scheme involving $1.5 million in counterfeit bank checks).
349. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-03 (2006), available at http://www.scbar.org/
member resources/ethics advisoryopinions/&id=631.
350. See Marsh, supra note 7, at 433.
351. Id.
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justifiably relying on the bank's misrepresentations. Yet for the average
customer, "[w]here banks and bank employees fall short and are responsible for
the customer's confusion, it is appropriate to allow claims of negligent
misrepresentation and [equitable] estoppel. 352
Moreover, in addition to the civil liability, a South Carolina lawyer will owe
to the bank, he will also face disciplinary sanctions for violating Rule 1.15(f).
However, Rule 1.15(f) enables a lawyer to fall victim to these counterfeit
schemes because it allows him to disburse uncollected funds. Consequently, if
the South Carolina Bar wishes to prevent its members from facing professional
and civil liabilities arising from counterfeit cashier's checks, then it should
petition the South Carolina Supreme Court to change Rule 1.15(f) so that it
restricts all collected funds equivalents similar to the restrictions placed on
personal checks.
In addition, there are several steps South Carolina lawyers may take to
prevent being exposed to counterfeit cashier's check schemes. Primarily, the
attorney will not face liability to the bank or suffer disciplinary sanctions if he
waits for final settlement before disbursing. If it is absolutely infeasible to wait
for final settlement, then the attorney should contact the bank identified as the
drawer on the check to verify the instrument's authenticity. 353 When making this
call, the attorney should independently find the drawer bank's contact
information because a counterfeiter will likely alter this information on the face
of the check.354 In addition, when possible, the attorney should require the
cashier's check to be drawn on a local bank.355 This measure will allow the
attorney to have the check physically inspected at the local bank to ensure its
authenticity. 356 In any event, bank customers in general and South Carolina
attorneys in particular should exercise caution when dealing with cashier's
checks due to the high potential for fraudulent schemes.
Clark H.C. Lacy

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.at 434.
See OCC CA 2007-1, supranote 6.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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